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Altruism and envy in contests: An evolutionarily stable symbiosis

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Abstract.

Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, and Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Kai A. Konrad

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  1. Kai A. Konrad
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Correspondence to Kai A. Konrad.

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I thank Helmut Bester, Friedel Bolle, Werner Güth and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. For a broader discussion of the economics of envy and a brief literature survey see, e.g., Mui (1995). Altruism has been discussed even more widely. Key references are Becker (1974, 1976), Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) and Bruce and Waldman (1990).

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Konrad, K. Altruism and envy in contests: An evolutionarily stable symbiosis. Soc Choice Welfare 22, 479–490 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0229-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0229-7

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