Using an Artificial Intelligence framework, we modeled influence of covid-19 physical distancing policies across relaxed (Sweden) and stringent (USA and Canada) contexts. Our findings suggest three important insights. First, the effective growth rate of covid-19 infections dropped in response to the approximate dates of key policy interventions. The drop was sharper in the case of the USA and Canada that actioned stringent policies but was more gradual in the case of Sweden that actioned a more relaxed policy. We find that the change points for spreading rates approximately coincide with the timelines of policy interventions across respective countries. Second, forecasted trend until mid-June in the USA was downward trending, stable, and linear. Sweden is likely headed in the other direction. That is, Sweden’s forecasted trend until mid-June appears to be non-linear and upward trending. Canada appears to fall somewhere in the middle—trend for the same period is flat. Third, a Kalman filter based robustness check indicates that by mid-June the USA will likely have close to two million virus cases, while Sweden will likely have over 44,000 covid-19 cases.
Specifically, we studied 16 policy interventions in the USA, Canada, and Sweden that ranged from school and workplace closing and restrictions on public gatherings and transport to testing and contact tracing policies. We found that Sweden had neither cancelled public events and closed public transport nor actioned stay at home requirements. Sweden outperformed its North American counterparts only in income support, debt contract relief, and contact tracing. Overall, Sweden’s policy has been much more relaxed and this could drive a higher number of covid-19 cases by mid-June.
In the case of the USA, the Bayesian SIR model predicts that by mid-June, there will likely be between 20,000 and 28,000 covid-19 new confirmed cases reported daily. However, relative to the past, the forecasted trend appears to be more downward trending, stable, and linear. Furthermore, we notice that the effective growth rate of covid-19 infections appears to drop around dates seeing key policy interventions characterized by Dehning et al. (2020) as forms of mild distancing, strong distancing, and contact ban on March 12, 2020, March 23, 2020, and April 7, 2020, respectively. Thus, as of May 10, 2020, we find evidence that the virus was clearly slowed down through USA’s relatively stringent policy interventions. Coinciding with such policy interventions, the first change point for the spreading rate may have occurred approximately around March 15, 2020, and the second change point may have occurred approximately around March 25, 2020. However, it can be fairly assumed that despite these actions, exponential growth was still implied. As a robustness check, our Kalman filter approach indicates that the USA is likely to have close to two million covid-19 cases by mid-June. However, the Kalman filter also does indicate a gradual flattening of the curve.
Furthermore, we believe that when the human element is considered, US counties that fall in the top right quadrant of the chart (e.g., New England, Mountain States, and Midwest) may be at the most risk for a surge in infections. These are places where hospitals currently have capacity and decision makers might feel better with relaxing suppression measures, even though new cases are currently on the rise.
In the case of Canada, the Bayesian SIR model predicts that by mid-June, the country may still have between 1000 and 2500 covid-19 new confirmed cases reported daily. Thus, as of May 10, 2020, we found evidence that the rate of new infections was decreasing (i.e., flattening of the curve) through Canada’s relatively stringent policy interventions on March 12, 2020, March 20, 2020, and March 31, 2020. Coinciding with such policy interventions, the first change point for the spreading rate may have occurred approximately around March 14, 2020, and the second change point may have occurred approximately around March 22, 2020. However, it can be fairly assumed that despite these actions exponential growth was still implied. To progress toward flattening the curve, Canada needed to undertake the third policy intervention, which it did take around March 31, 2020. As a robustness check, our Kalman filter approach indicates that the Canadian provinces of Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec are likely to have > 10,000, > 32,000, and > 69,000 covid-19 cases by mid-June. Of these Canadian provinces, only Quebec appears to still be showing a growth in covid-19 infections.
In the case of Sweden, the Bayesian SIR model predicts that by mid-June, the country may still have upward trending of 600 covid-19 new confirmed cases reported daily. However, the forecasted trend appeared to be non-linear and upward trending. Furthermore, we noticed that drop in the effective growth rate of covid-19 infections appeared to have been only gradual around dates seeing key policy interventions, as described above (March 1, 2020, March 12, 2020, and March 30, 2020). Thus, as of May 10, 2020, we find evidence that the virus did not slow down as rapidly in Sweden. We infer that the likely reason is Sweden’s relatively relaxed policy intervention. Coinciding with such relaxed policy interventions, the first change point for the spreading rate may have occurred approximately around March 7, 2020, and the second change point may have occurred approximately around March 27, 2020. However, despite these actions exponential growth was still implied. As a robustness check, our Kalman filter approach indicates that Sweden will likely have > 44,000 covid-19 cases by mid-June.
Our analysis has several strengths. We show that stringent physical distancing policies are influencing the downward covid-19 trend (as in the case of USA) or are flattening the curve (as in the case of Canada). We also find that the relaxed physical distancing policy might be influencing the upward covid-19 trend (as in the case of Sweden). We base our analysis on changing covid-19 spreading rates triggered by specific policy interventions. Our greatest limitation is that we are making a forecast on a rapidly evolving scenario. Though we forecast the big picture and triangulate our analysis using a novel AI framework based on timeline of policy interventions, we may be missing out on impact of individual policies across the USA, Canada, and Sweden.
Furthermore, we also make a novel rapid assessment of the current status of the outbreak. We determine US counties where hospital resources are stretched thin, those with capacity, and those with large increases or decreases in new cases. The data visualization could be operationalized for decision making by setting thresholds for turning suppression measures on or off based on hospital capacity and new cases. These thresholds would correspond to regions of the chart, and counties falling within those regions could consider the policy recommendation. We feel that the assumptions made to calculate the metrics are reasonable given the landscape of uncertainty and lack of reliable data on true infection and adverse outcome rates; however, there are several improvements required to make the tool sufficiently robust to inform policy decisions. We know that age and presence of comorbidities have a significant effect on hospitalization rate, so a model of county-by-county hospitalization rate that used those factors as inputs could improve the estimate of currently hospitalized patients. Similarly, bed capacity could be modeled at the county level, analogous to the work that the HGHI team did for hospital referral regions. Lastly, the week-over-week case delta metric currently assumes a stable rate of testing and is susceptible to shifts when that assumption is violated. It could be improved to account for varying test rates if that data was available at the county level.
In conclusion, our study has made some headway in understanding the implications of covid-19 policy interventions. Though we do not study the impact of individual policies, we do account for the timelines of governmental interventions that cluster various policies related to covid-19. We show that fall in effective growth rate of covid-19 infections was sharper in the case of the USA and Canada that actioned stringent policies but was more gradual in the case of Sweden that actioned a more relaxed policy. Our study exhorts policy makers to take these results into account as they consider the implications of relaxing lockdown measures.