Skip to main content

Epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications: Introduction


This paper is written as an introduction to epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications. It starts with both semantics and syntax of classical logic, and goes to the Hilbert-style proof-theory and Kripke-style model theory of epistemic logics. In these theories, we discuss individual decision making in some simple game examples. In particular, we will discuss the distinction between beliefs and knowledge, and how false beliefs play roles in game theoretic decision making. Finally, we discuss extensions of epistemic logics to incorporate common knowledge. In the extension, we discuss also false beliefs on common knowledge.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations


Additional information

Received: July 1, 2000; revised version: April 19, 2001

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Kaneko, M. Epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications: Introduction. Econ Theory 19, 7–62 (2002).

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI:

  • Keywords and Phrases: Classical logic, Epistemic logic, Common knowledge logic, Beliefs, Knowledge, Dominant strategy, Decision criterion, Epistemic depth of a formula.
  • JEL Classification Numbers: C60, C69, D89.