Summary.
The paper introduces a version of rationalizability that ignores strategies that are supported by negligible sets of beliefs, where a negligible set is one whose Lebesgue measure is zero. The theory is developed solely for the special case of point rationalizability; conditions are then derived under which point rationalizability entails no loss of generality. When these conditions obtain, the predictions yielded by this approach are often (although not always) a significant reduction over what is predicted by rationalizability.
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Received: September 10 1996; revised version: July 18, 1997
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Anthonisen, N. Strong rationalizability for two-player noncooperative games. Economic Theory 13, 143–169 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050245
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050245