Skip to main content
Log in

Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power

  • Article
  • Published:
Economic Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Summary.

If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Received: August 29, 1996; revised version: March 24, 1997

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Campbell, D., Kelly, J. Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power. Economic Theory 12, 147–162 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050214

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050214

Navigation