Economic Theory

, Volume 11, Issue 1, pp 215–224

Matching and bargaining models of markets: approximating small markets by large markets

  • John Wooders

DOI: 10.1007/s001990050186

Cite this article as:
Wooders, J. Economic Theory (1998) 11: 215. doi:10.1007/s001990050186


We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.

JEL Classification Numbers: C73 C78. 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Wooders
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics, McClelland HallUniversity of ArizonaTucsonUSA

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