Summary.
This paper contributes to the recent focus on dynamics in noncooperative games when players use inductive learning. The most well-known inductive learning rule, Brown’s fictitious play, is known to converge for games, yet many examples exist where fictitious play reasoning fails to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Building on ideas from chaotic dynamics, this paper develops a geometric conceptualization of instability in games, allowing for a reinterpretation of existing results and suggesting avenues for new results.
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Received: October 27, 1995 revised version May 2, 1996
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Richards, D. The geometry of inductive reasoning in games. Economic Theory 10, 185–193 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050153
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050153