Abstract
This paper applies the contract theory to study the role of National Development Bank (NDB) in financing infrastructure investment. We first show that to mitigate overrun issues resulting from the agency problem during the infrastructure construction, the government uses mixed financing strategy combining fiscal funding with NDB loans. We then endogenize the NDB investment strategy to study the determinants of NDB profit and use cross-country panel data to empirically test our model predictions.
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Jiang, S., Xia, J., Xu, J. et al. A theory of National Development Bank: long-term investment and the agency problem. Econ Theory 76, 995–1024 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01484-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01484-2