Abstract
We study the impact of exogenous news on the classic Bayesian persuasion problem. The sender supplies information over multiple periods, but is unable to commit at the onset to the information that she will supply in periods ahead. A tension then emerges between the sender and her future self. We show that by resolving this tension, more informative news can make the sender better off.
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Bizzotto, J., Vigier, A. Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?. Econ Theory 72, 705–721 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01321-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01321-w