Economic Theory

pp 1–16

Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games

Research Article

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0988-x

Cite this article as:
Hwang, SH. & Newton, J. Econ Theory (2016). doi:10.1007/s00199-016-0988-x

Abstract

This paper considers populations of agents whose behavior when playing some underlying game is governed by perturbed best (or better) response dynamics with perturbation probabilities that depend log-linearly on payoffs, a class that includes the logit choice rule. A convention is a state at which every agent plays a strategy that corresponds to the same strict Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. For coordination games with zero payoff off-diagonal, it is shown that the difficulty of leaving the basin of attraction of a convention can be well approximated by only considering paths of transitions on which an identical perturbation repeatedly affects one of the populations.

Keywords

Evolution Coordination Logit Payoff dependence 

JEL Classification

C73 C78 

Funding information

Funder NameGrant NumberFunding Note
National Research Foundation of Korea (KR)
  • NRF-2016S1A5A8019496
Australian Research Council (AU)
  • DE130101768

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sogang UniversitySeoulKorea
  2. 2.University of SydneySydneyAustralia

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