Abstract
We analyze the provision of repair services (aftermarket services that are required for a certain fraction of durable units after sales) through an international duopoly model in which a domestic firm and a foreign firm compete in the domestic market. Trade liberalization in goods, if not accompanied by the liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) in services, induces the domestic firm to establish service facilities for repairing the foreign firm’s products. This weakens the firms’ competition in the product market, and the resulting anticompetitive effect hurts consumers and reduces world welfare. Despite the anticompetitive effect, trade liberalization may also hurt the foreign firm because the repairs reduce the sales of the imported good in the product market. Liberalization of service FDI helps resolve the problem because it induces the foreign firm to establish service facilities for its own products.
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Notes
“It is noteworthy that the actual use of FDI in the service sector was US$61.45 billion, constituting over half of the total FDI in China for the first time. The social security service industry, electrical machinery repair industry, and the entertainment industry were noticeable standouts.” (See “FDI in China Springs Back by 5.25 % in 2013,” China Briefing, January 17, 2014, accessed on 1 July 2015 at http://www.chinabriefing.com/news/2014/01/17/fdiinchinaspringsbackby525percentin2013.html).
A report entitled “Study on Competitiveness of the European Shipbuilding Industry” prepared by ECORYS SCG Group in 2009 states, “The position of Europe in the ship repair market is relatively strong. Total turnover in Europe in this industry was Euro 3.5 billion in 2007.” (p. 35), and “...CESA in its annual report estimates turnover in the European shipbuilding industry at Euro 16.3 billion in 2007 (including Turkey)” (footnote 10, p. 27). Then the ratio of ship repair turnover to shipbuilding turnover is 3.5 billion/16.3 billion \(\approx \) 0.21. The report is available at http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/10506/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native, accessed on 15 October 2015.
The demands for repairs have also been increasing. For instance, it is reported that the number of requests for repair which Panasonic receives is 130,000 in 1995 and 370,000 in 1999, and the Home Appliance Recycling Act (Japan) implemented in 2001 was expected to increase the demand for repair service (Nikkei Ecology, April, 2001). Canon receives 1,000,000 inquiries that are associated with repairs (Nikkei Joho Strategy, December, 2003). Louis Vuitton Japan repaired 330,000 garments in 2006 (Nikkei Business, June 11, 2007).
For example, although some imported infrared heaters had a problem and they were subject to a product recall in Japan, some foreign producers were not able to provide repair services for their own products in Japan (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 18 May 2010 (evening)).
For example, in Japan, Nidec Sankyo Service Engineering Corporation, which is a domestic subsidiary of the Japanese machinetool company, Nidec Sankyo Corporation, is providing maintenance and repair services for competitors’ products, including imported products (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, April 18, 1994). Masuda Ironworks provides maintenance and repairs of machines, dies, and molds produced by other companies (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 22, 2010). Fuji Xerox provides maintenance and repair services for office equipment even if customers use the equipment of other firms (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, April 24, 2004). Several IT companies, IBM and Fujitsu, provide repair services for competitors’ network products (http://www935.ibm.com/services/jp/ja/itservices/ibm_mvms.html and http://jp.fujitsu.com/solutions/support/sdk/sdexpert/multivendor/services/, accessed on June 26, 2015). NEC Fielding Ltd., a domestic subsidiary of the Japanese electronic firm NEC, provides the support services of IT system even if the system uses other companies’ personal computers (http://solution.fielding.co.jp/service/solution_search_3/maltivendor_support/, accessed on June 26, 2015).
The demand for repairs becomes inelastic below the threshold price of repairs under which all broken units are repaired because the amount of broken units is fixed in the aftermarket. Even if the aftermarket is monopolized by a single firm, the monopolist would set the threshold price because the marginal revenue of repairs always exceeds the marginal cost of them. This means that the monopolist’s inability to commit in the aftermarket does not generate any efficiency loss. For the same reason, the competition in the aftermarket does not directly lead to efficiency gains.
The main results of our paper would be preserved even if the firms engage in Bertrand competition.
Our results would not change even if we consider ad valorem tariffs instead of specific tariffs. It can be shown that the export price (i.e., the consumer price minus the specific tariff) of good F is decreasing in t. This means that the ad valorem equivalent of the specific tariff, t/(the export price), increases as well. Therefore, the qualitative nature of our model would remain unchanged.
To ensure that the marginal revenue of each firm is decreasing in its sales, we also assume \(2V_{ii}(d_{D},d_{F})+( \partial V_{ii}(d_{D},d_{F})/\partial d_{i}) d_{i}<0\) holds.
The qualitative nature of our results would remain unchanged if broken units have a positive scrap value. See Sect. 4.6 for a discussion.
By regarding t as the degree of cost disadvantages of the foreign firm, we can interpret the situation as if the two firms are heterogeneous in the production cost. The main results of this paper would be mostly unchanged with this alternative setup. However, the welfare property of the model needs to be slightly modified because the higher cost of the foreign firm no longer works as a transfer from the foreign country to the domestic country as the tariff does.
The main results of the paper would be unchanged even if we assume the producers of goods can exploit the profits of ISOs by selling parts and other components that are indispensable to provide repair services. If ISOs are completely free from the producers’ influences, however, there are some results specific to ISOs. See Sect. 4.1 for details.
By the same reasoning, the equilibrium properties of our model are unchanged even if firms cannot provide a full warranty, and the two firms engage in price competition in the aftermarket. See Sect. 4.3 for details.
This equilibrium property is the same as that of Chen and Ross (1998), though the logic behind our model is slightly different because the rival producer, rather than the original producer, provides the repair services.
The outcomes of the NR equilibrium would be unchanged even if we allow the repurchase of good F or the refund by firm F after consumers find the broken units. See Sect. 4.4 for details.
Lemma 2 implies that \(\Delta \varPi _{D}\) is maximized at \(t=0\). Let \(\overline{t}\) denote the minimum level of tariff that eliminates the imports of good F under the RR equilibrium and the NR equilibrium. Clearly, \(\Delta \varPi _{D}=0\) holds if \(t=\overline{t}\). Therefore, if \(K_{D}\) satisfies \(K_{D}<\overline{K}_{D}\), there exists a threshold value of tariff, \(t_{D}\), such that \(\Delta \varPi _{D}<K_{D}\) holds for \(t\in (t_{D}, \overline{t})\), \(\Delta \varPi _{D}=K_{D}\) holds for \(t=t_{D}\), and \(\Delta \varPi _{D}>K_{D}\) holds for \(t\in [0,t_{D})\).
We can see that \(\Delta \varPi _{F}\) jumps up at \(t=t_{D}\). If firm F does not provide the services, the equilibrium of the entire game becomes the NR equilibrium for \(t\ge t_{D}\) and the RR equilibrium for \(t<t_{D}\). Hence, \(\Delta \varPi _{F}=\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{NR}\) holds for \(t\ge t_{D}\) and \(\Delta \varPi _{F}=\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{RR}\) holds for \(t<t_{D}\). By Proposition 3, \(\varPi _{F}^{NR}>\varPi _{F}^{RR}\) holds, which implies that firm F has a stronger incentive to undertake a service FDI if it faces a potential entry of the rival firm.
It is ambiguous whether \(\Delta \varPi _{F}\) is decreasing or if there is an inverseU shaped curve in t. The increased imports from a tariff reduction increase firm F’s gains from the entry, but there is an additional effect. In the RR subgame and the NR subgame, because firm F cannot capture the rents associated with the broken units, the demand curves are flatter than those in the OR case (see Fig. 1). Hence, the tariff reduction increases \(x_{F}\) less in the OR subgame than it does in the RR and the NR subgames. If the cost of providing services (\(m_{L}\)) is sufficiently large and that of supplying the goods (c and t) is sufficiently small, the latter effect dominates the former effect and trade liberalization undermines firm F’s entry. See the Appendix for details. In Fig. 4, we depict the case where \(\Delta \varPi _{F}\) is an inverseU shaped curve in t. The shape of \(\Delta \varPi _{F}\) does not affect the main results of the paper.
The entry decisions of the two firms do not depend on the fullwarranty assumption. See Sect. 4.3 for details.
See the Appendix for the detailed calculations of the effects of trade liberalization within each regime.
It is ambiguous whether the switch increases the imports of good F, though it always increases the consumption of good F (see Proposition 1).
Suppose a single ISO monopolizes the provision of the repair services for good F. The ISO’s profit maximization problem in stage 3 is the same as that of firm D in the RR case. The ISO sets r such that \(R_{F}=(1q) x_{F}\) holds. Besides that, the repair price becomes lower if more than two ISOs or both an ISO and firm D enter the repair market. This means that all broken units will be repaired in equilibrium if at least one ISO enters the repair market. See Appendix for details.
Since \(\varPi _{ISO}=K_{ISO}\) holds at \(t=t_{ISO}\), \(\varPi _{ISO}K_{ISO}\) becomes smaller as \(t_{ISO}\) approaches \(t_{1}\).
We can confirm that \(CS^{OS,k}\) is decreasing in t, meaning that trade liberalization within the outsourcing equilibrium benefits consumers as long as the same firm is outsourced.
In addition to the two cases just mentioned, there are other cases in which trade liberalization has the anticompetitive effects. Trade liberalization does not always promote the outsourcing in this extension. This is because it is ambiguous whether trade liberalization increases or decreases firm F’s gains from outsourcing. If a decrease in t lowers firm F’s gain, firm F becomes less willing to offer service outsourcing as trade liberalization proceeds. In this case, a tariff reduction from \(t=t_{0} \) to \(t=t_{1}\) change the equilibrium regime from the NR equilibrium or the OSISO equilibrium to the RR equilibrium or the ISO equilibrium, and the shift hurts consumers and worsens world welfare.
We have assumed that \(m_{H}\) \(\ge m_{L}\) holds. If instead \(m_{H}<m_{L}\), then firm D wins the price competition in repairing good F, but the main results would still remain unchanged. A detailed explanation will be provided upon request.
Furthermore, if the imported good is sold as a limited version with special specifications, the repurchase of the good is impossible.
An increase in \(\omega \) decreases \(\varPi _{F}^{OS}(\omega )\), but it increases \(\varPi _{D}^{OS}(\omega )\) and thereby reduces the fixed fee, \( \varOmega \). When \(\omega \) is small, the latter effect dominates the former effect. This results in the positive perunit royalty in service outsourcing.
References
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We wish to thank two anonymous referees for insightful comments and suggestions. We thank Kenzo Abe, Masahiro Ashiya, Richard Baldwin, Taiji Furusawa, Hiroshi Kinokuni, Kazuharu Kiyono, Jim Markusen, Kaz Miyagiwa, Takao Ohkawa, Mauricio Varela, Mike Waldman, and seminar participants at GRIPS, Osaka University, University of British Columbia, the JEA Spring Meeting, the Hitotsubashi COE Conference on International Trade and FDI 2010 and 2012, ATW 2013, the 11th IIOC, and EARIE 2013 for their helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Akira Sasahara and ChengTao Tang for excellent research assistance. Jota Ishikawa acknowledges financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science through the GrantinAid for Scientific Research (S) Grant Number 26220503, Hodaka Morita acknowledges financial support from the Australian Research Council, and Hiroshi Mukunoki acknowledges financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science through the GrantinAid for Scientific Research (A) and (C) Grant Numbers 24243034 and 26380310. The usual disclaimer applies.
Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
At stage 3, firm D’s maximization problem is to choose r that maximizes \(( rm_{H}) R_{F}\) subject to \(R_{F}\le ( 1q) x_{F}\). Let the Lagrangian function be \(L=( rm_{H}) R_{F}+\lambda \{( 1q) x_{F}R_{F}\}\) where \(\lambda \) is the Lagrangian multiplier. The firstorder conditions are given by:
(i) Suppose \(\lambda >0\). This implies that \(\widehat{R}_{F}=(1q) x_{F}\) and \(\widehat{r}=V_{F}( x_{D},x_{F}) \) hold at stage 3. At stage 2, the representative consumer anticipates that all broken units will be repaired and her maximization problem is given by \(\max _{x_{D},x_{F}}V(x_{D},qx_{F}+( 1q) x_{F})\) \(+Z\) subject to \(p_{D}x_{D}+p_{F}x_{F}\le I ( 1q) \widehat{r}x_{F}\). The firstorder conditions yield \(p_{D}=V_{D}(x_{D},x_{F}),\) \(p_{F}+( 1q) \widehat{r}=V_{F}(x_{D},x_{F})\). The profit maximization problems of firm D and firm F are respectively given by:
By solving the firstorder conditions, the optimal sales of the two firms, \((x_{D}^{RR},x_{F}^{RR})\), must satisfy:
By (7), (8), and \(c\ge m_{H}\),
Therefore, \((x_{D}^{RR},x_{F}^{RR})\) and \(R_{F}^{RR}=( 1q) x_{F}^{RR}\) actually constitute an equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose \(\lambda =0\). This means that firm D sets \(R_{F}\) so that only a part of the broken units is repaired (i.e., \(R_{F}<(1q) x_{F}\)). By (7),
holds. Since we have assumed that \(V_{FF}(d_{D},d_{F})<0\) and \(2V_{FF}(d_{D},d_{F})+(\partial V_{FF}(d_{D},d_{F}) /\partial d_{F})d_{F}<0\) hold, \(2V_{FF}(d_{D},d_{F})+(\partial V_{FF}(d_{D},d_{F})/\partial d_{F})D<0\) holds for any \(D\in (0,d_{F}]\). Combining this property with (8) and \( c\ge m_{H}\), we have:
This inequality contradicts (9). Therefore, \(\lambda =0\) cannot hold in equilibrium.\(\square \)
1.2 The FF line and the ff line in Fig. 3
Given \(x_{D}\), firm F’s reaction function in the NR subgame is \(q\widehat{x}_{F}^{NR}(x_{D})\), where
holds by (6). By substituting \(x_{F}=q\widehat{x}_{F}^{NR}(x_{D})\) into \(\partial \varPi _{F}/\partial x_{F}\) in the OR subgame, we have \(\partial \varPi _{F}/\partial x_{F}=V_{F}(x_{D},q\widehat{x}_{F}^{NR}(x_{D}))+qV_{FF}(x_{D},q\widehat{x}_{F}^{NR}(x_{D}))\) \(\widehat{x}_{F}^{NR}(x_{D})\{c+t+(1q)m_{L}\}=(c+t)/q\{c+t+(1q)m_{L}\}=( 1q) (c+tqm_{L})/q>0\). Therefore, holding \(x_{D}\) constant, firm F’s optimal supply in the OR subgame, \(\widehat{x}_{F}^{OR}(x_{D})\), is larger than \(q\widehat{x}_{F}^{NR}(x_{D})\). Hence, the FF line locates outside the ff line.
1.3 Proof of Proposition 1
By solving (1) and (2), we have the equilibrium sales in the RR case as:
To guarantee \(x_{D}^{RR}>0\) and \(x_{F}^{RR}>0\), we assume \(a>\underline{a}\equiv [2( c+t) bq\{c+( 1q) m_{L}\}]/(2b)q\) is satisfied.
By solving (3) and (4), we have the equilibrium sales in the OR case as:
We can easily confirm that \(x_{D}^{NR}>0\) and \(x_{F}^{NR}>0\) hold as long as \(x_{D}^{RR}>0\) and \(x_{F}^{RR}>0\) hold.
By solving (3) and (4), and using (10) and (11), the equilibrium sales in the NR case are given by
By (13), it is obvious that \(x_{D}^{RR}<x_{D}^{NR}\) and \(x_{F}^{RR}<x_{F}^{NR}\) hold. By (10) and (11), and (13), we have \(x_{D}^{RR}x_{D}^{NR}=( 1q) b( cqm_{L}+t)/\{( 4b^{2}) q\}<0\), \(x_{F}^{RR}qx_{F}^{NR}=( 1q)qb^{2}x_{F}^{NR}/\{4( 2q) b^{2}\}>0\), and \(x_{F}^{RR}qx_{F}^{NR}=2( 1q) (cqm_{L}+t)/\{(4b^{2}) q\}>0.\) \(\square \)
1.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The equilibrium consumer surplus under the quadratic utility function in the k (\(k\in \{RR,OR,NR\}\)) case is given by:
Since all broken units of good F are repaired both in the RR equilibrium and in the OR equilibrium, \(d_{i}^{RR}=x_{i}^{RR}\) and \(d_{i}^{RR}=x_{i}^{RR}\) hold for \(i\in \{D,F\}\). In the NR equilibrium, on the other hand, \(d_{D}^{NR}=x_{D}^{NR}\) and \(d_{F}^{NR}=qx_{F}^{NR}\) hold because the broken units of good F remain unrepaired. We have:
where \(B_{1}=q(2b) \{16+4b16b^{2}b^{3}+4b^{4}+qb(4+4bb^{2}2b^{3})\}a+2b\{47b^{2}+2b^{4}( 43b^{2}+b^{4}) q\}tq(43b^{2})(1q)\{8b^{2}(3q)\}m_{L}+\{2b(47b^{2}+2b^{4})b^{2}(43b^{2}) q^{2}q(2+b)(164b16b^{2}+5b^{3}+2b^{4})\}c\). We can verify that \(\partial B_{1}/\partial a>0\) holds. Hence, we have \(B_{1}>\left. B_{1}\right _{a=\underline{a}}=2(2+b)(2b^{2})\{4b^{2}(2q)\}\{(1q)(cqm_{L})+t\}>0\) and so \(CS^{RR}<CS^{NR}\) holds. Similarly, we have:
where \(B_{2}=2q( b+1) ( 2b) ^{2}a\{( 43b^{2}) ( 1+q) +2b^{3}q\}c( 43b^{2}) ( 1+q) t(43b^{2}+2b^{3})( 1q) qm_{L}\). Since \(B_{2}\) is decreasing in a, we have \(B_{2}>\left. B_{2}\right _{a=\underline{a}}=( 1q) (4+4bb^{2})( cqm_{L}) +\{4+4bb^{2}q( 43b^{2}) \}t>0\). Consequently, we have \(CS^{RR}<CS^{NR}<CS^{OR}\).\(\square \)
1.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Under the quadratic utility function, the operating profit of firm D in each equilibrium is calculated as follows: \(\varPi _{D}^{RR}=( x_{D}^{RR}) ^{2}+( 1q) [( x_{F}^{RR})^{2}+\{(c+t)/qm_{H}\}x_{F}^{RR}+bx_{D}^{RR}x_{F}^{RR}]\), \(\varPi _{D}^{OR}=( x_{D}^{OR}) ^{2}\), and \(\varPi _{D}^{NR}=( x_{D}^{NR}) ^{2}\). Similarly, the operating profit of firm F is given by: \(\varPi _{F}^{RR}=q( x_{F}^{RR}) ^{2}\), \(\varPi _{F}^{OR}=( x_{F}^{OR}) ^{2}\), and \(\varPi _{F}^{NR}=( qx_{F}^{NR}) ^{2}\). In the RR case, in addition to the profit from selling good D presented in the first term, firm D can grab a part of the profits generated from the consumption of good F by providing the repair services for good F. This is reflected in the second term of the first equation.

(i)
We have \(\varPi _{F}^{RR}\varPi _{F}^{NR}=( 1q) \{16( 1b^{2}) +( 4q) b^{4}\}( x_{F}^{RR})^{2}/( 4b^{2}) ^{2}<0\) and \(\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{NR}=4( 1q) ( c+tqm_{L}) [\{a(2b)+bc\}qq( 1q) ( 1b) m_{L}( q+1) ( c+t) ]/\{(4b^{2})^{2}q^{2}\}>4( 1q) ^{2}( c+tqm_{L})^{2}/\{(4b^{2})^{2}q^{2}\}>0\) where the inequalities are due to \(a>\) \(\underline{a}\). Hence, \(\varPi _{F}^{RR}<\varPi _{F}^{NR}<\varPi _{F}^{OR}\) is satisfied.

(ii)
We have \(\varPi _{D}^{RR}\varPi _{D}^{NR}=\{(1q)B_{3}x_{F}^{RR}\}/(4b^{2}) ^{2}\{4(2q)b^{2}\}q\) where \(B_{3}=a(2b)\{4(1b)(2+b)^{2}+(3+2b)b^{4}+(42b^{2}b^{3})b^{2}q\}q+2\{1620b^{2}+5b^{4}+2(2b^{2})b^{2}q\}t+bq(1q)\{164(1q)b^{2}b^{4}\}m_{L}(4b^{2})^{2}\{4(2q)b^{2}\}qm_{H}+\{2( 1620b^{2}+5b^{4})+(2+b)(82b^{2}b^{3})bq+4b^{3}q^{2}\}c\). By using \(a>\) \(\underline{a}\) and \(c>m_{H}\), we can confirm that \(B_{3}>(2+b)\{4(2q)b^{2}\}\{(84b2b^{2}+b^{3}q)c(2+b)(2b)^{2}qm_{H}+2(42bb^{2})t+b^{3}(1q)qm_{L}\}>(2+b)\{4(2q)b^{2}\}\{2c(42bb^{2})((1q)c+t)+b^{3}(1q) qm_{L}\}>0\). The inequality means that \(\varPi _{D}^{RR}>\varPi _{D}^{NR}\) holds. Besides that, \(x_{D}^{OR}<x_{D}^{NR}\) (see Proposition 1) implies that \(\varPi _{D}^{OR}<\varPi _{D}^{NR}\) holds. Consequently, we have \(\varPi _{D}^{OR}<\varPi _{D}^{NR}<\varPi _{D}^{RR}\).\(\square \)
1.6 Proof of Lemma 2
We have \(\partial \{\varPi _{D}^{RR}\varPi _{D}^{NR}\}/\partial t=2(1q) B_{4}/[(4b^{2}) ^{2}\{4(2q)b^{2}\}^{2}q^{2}]\) where \(B_{4}=(2b) \{82(2+b)b+(2q)b^{3}\}b^{2}qa+4\{1620b^{2}+5b^{4}+2b^{2}(2b^{2})q\}t(4b^{2})^{2}\{2(2b^{2})+b^{2}q\}qm_{H}+2b^{3}\{8(3q)b^{2}\}q(1q)m_{L}+4(1+b)(2b^{2})b^{2}q+b^{5}(1+q)q\}c.\) Since \(\partial B_{4}/\partial a>0\) holds, \(B_{4}>\left. B_{4}\right _{a=\underline{a}}=(2+b)\{4b^{2}(2q)\}[(84b2b^{2}+b^{3}q)(cm_{H})+2( 42bb^{2})\{t+(1q)m_{H}\}+(1q)qb^{3}m_{L}]>0\). Hence, \(\partial (\varPi _{D}^{RR}\varPi _{D}^{NR})/\partial t<0\) is satisfied.\(\square \)
1.7 The effect of a tariff on \(\Delta \varPi _F\)
Firm F’s gains from entry are given by \(\Delta \varPi _{F}=\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{NR}\) if \(\Delta \varPi _{F}\le K_{F}\) and \(\Delta \varPi _{F}=\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{RR}\) otherwise. We have \(\partial ^{2}(\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{NR})/\partial a\partial t=4(1q)/\{q(2b)(b+2)^{2}\}>0\) and \(\partial ^{2}(\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{RR})/\partial a\partial t=4(1q)\{8b^{2}(3q)\}b^{2}[(2b)(2+b)^{2}\{4b^{2}(2q)\}^{2}]>0\).
Besides that, we have \(\left. \partial (\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{NR})/\partial t\right _{a=\underline{a}}=\left. \partial (\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{RR})/\partial t\right _{a=\underline{a}}=8(1q)\{c+tqm_{L}\}/\{q(4b^{2})^{2}\}<0\). Hence, we can derive the unique cutoff level of a, \(\widetilde{a}^{N}=[c\{2+(2b)q\}+2(1+q)t\{2q+(1q) b\}qm_{L}]/(2b)q\}\), such that \(\partial (\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{NR})/\partial t>0\) holds for \(a>\widetilde{a}^{N}\), \(\partial (\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{NR})/\partial t=0\) holds for \(a=\widetilde{a}^{N}\), and \(\partial (\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{NR})/\partial t<0\) holds for \(a\in (\underline{a},\widetilde{a}^{N})\). Similarly, we can derive \(\widetilde{a}^{E}=[2\{(4b^{2})^{2}+b^{2}q(8b^{2}(3q))\}t+(2b)\{2(2b)(2+b)^{2}+b^{2}q(8b^{2}(3q))\}c(2b)\{16+8b12b^{2}2b^{3}+3b^{4}+b^{2}q(8b^{2}(4q))\}qm_{L}]/\{(2b)(8b^{2}(3q))b^{2}q\}\) such that \(\partial (\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{RR})/\partial t>0\) holds for \(a>\widetilde{a}^{E}\), \(\partial (\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{RR})/\partial t=0\) holds for \(a=\widetilde{a}^{E}\), and \(\partial (\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{RR})\partial t<0\) holds for \(a\in (\underline{a},\widetilde{a}^{E})\).
We can easily confirm that \(\partial \widetilde{a}^{N}/\partial c>0\), \(\partial \widetilde{a}^{E}/\partial c>0\), \(\partial \widetilde{a}^{N}/\partial t>0\), \(\partial \widetilde{a}^{E}/\partial t>0\), \(\partial \widetilde{a}^{N}/\partial m_{L}<0\), and \(\partial \widetilde{a}^{E}/\partial m_{L}<0\). Hence, \(\partial (\Delta \varPi _{F})/\partial t>0\) (resp. \(\partial (\Delta \varPi _{F})/\partial t<0\)) is more likely to hold as c and t become smaller (resp. large) and \(m_{L}\) becomes larger (resp. small).
1.8 Proof of Proposition 4
Let \(\sigma _{i}\in \{E,N\}\) denote firm i’s (\(i\in \{D,F\}\)) action and \( \Delta \varPi _{i}(\sigma _{i},t)\) denote firm i’s gains in operating profits from providing the repair services for good F given the action of the other firm, \(\sigma _{i}\), and the tariff level. E represents entry into the repair service market for good F, while N represents no entry. Firm D’s gains are given by \(\Delta \varPi _{D}(N,t)=\varPi _{D}^{RR}\varPi _{D}^{NR}\) and \(\Delta \varPi _{D}(E,t)=0\). We have \(\Delta \varPi _{D}(E,t)=0\) because firm D cannot earn positive profits from the repair services if firm F chooses \(\sigma _{F}=E\). Regarding firm F’s gains from the entry, we have \(\Delta \varPi _{F}(N,t)=\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{NR}\) and \(\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t)=\varPi _{F}^{OR}\varPi _{F}^{RR}\). Since \(\varPi _{F}^{NR}>\varPi _{F}^{RR}\) holds given t , \(\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t)>\Delta \varPi _{F}(N,t)\) holds, which means that firm F ’s gains from the entry are larger when firm D also chooses the entry.\(\square \)
First, we consider firm D’s best response to firm F’s action. Because \( \Delta \varPi _{D}(E,t)=0<K_{D}\) holds, firm D’s best response is \(\sigma _{D}=N\) if firm F chooses \(\sigma _{F}=E\). Firm D enters the service market only if firm F chooses \(\sigma _{F}=N\). When \(\Delta \varPi _{D}(N,0)>K_{D}\) is satisfied, there exists a unique cutoff level of t, denoted by \(t_{D}\), such that:
holds. For tractability, we set \(t_{D}=0\) if \(\Delta \varPi _{D}(N,0)\le K_{D}\) holds. Hence, firm D’s best response is \(\sigma _{D}=E\) if firm F chooses \(\sigma _{F}=N\) and the tariff level is less than \(t_{D}\), and it is \(\sigma _{D}=N\) otherwise. Given firm D’s action, firm F’s gains from entry is expressed as:

(i)
Suppose \(\Delta \varPi _{F}>K_{F}\) holds. In this case, choosing \(\sigma _{F}=E\) becomes firm F’s dominant strategy. Since \(\Delta \varPi _{D}(E,t)=0\le K_{D}\) is always satisfied, firm D’s best response to firm F’s entry is to choose \(\sigma _{D}=N\). As a result, the OR case become the unique equilibrium outcome.

(ii)
Suppose \(t<t_{D}\) holds. In this case, \(\Delta \varPi _{D}(N,t)>K_{D}\) is satisfied. Since \(\Delta \varPi _{F}=\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t)<K_{F}\) is also satisfied, choosing \(\sigma _{F}=N\) becomes firm F’s dominant strategy and firm D’s best response is to choose \(\sigma _{F}=E\). As a result, the RR case becomes the unique equilibrium outcome.

(iii)
Suppose \(t\ge t_{D}\) holds. In this case, \(\Delta \varPi _{D}(N,t)\le K_{D}\) is satisfied. Since \(\Delta \varPi _{F}=\Delta \varPi _{F}(N,t)<K_{F}\) holds, choosing \(\sigma _{F}=N\) becomes firm F’s dominant strategy and firm D’s best response is to choose \(\sigma _{F}=N\). As a result, the OR case becomes the unique equilibrium outcome.\(\square \)
1.9 The effects of trade liberalization within each regime
By (11), (12), and (13), we can easily verify that \(\partial x_{F}^{RR}/\partial t<0\), \(\partial x_{F}^{OR}/\partial t<0\), and \(\partial x_{F}^{NR}/\partial t<0\) hold. Hence, given the structure of the repair market, trade liberalization in goods always increases the imports of good F.
(i) Consumer surplus: In the RR equilibrium, \(\partial CS^{RR}/\partial t=[q\{2(1b^{2})(2b)+b( 2b^{2})q+b^{2}q^{2}\}ac(1+b)\{2(1b) (2qb)+b( 2b) q^{2}\}+bq( 1q)\{2( 1b^{2})q(2b^{2})\}m_{L}\{4(1b^{2}) +b^{2}q^{2}\}t]/[2\{4( 2q) b^{2}\}^{2}q^{2}]>\left. \partial CS^{RR}/\partial t\right _{a=\underline{a}}=b\{( 1q) ( cqm_{L}) +t\}/[( 2b) q\{4( 2q) b^{2}\}]<0\) holds.
In the OR equilibrium, we have \(\partial CS^{OR}/\partial t=[( 1+b) ( 2b) ^{2}\{ac( 1q) m_{L}\}( 43b^{2}) t]/(4b^{2})^{2}<\left. \partial CS^{OR}/\partial t\right _{a=\underline{a}}=[2( 1+b) ( 2b) ( 1q) ( cqm_{L}) +\{4( 1q) ( 1b^{2}) +(2+(2q)b)b\}t]/\{(4b^{2})^{2}q\}<0\).
In the NR equilibrium, \(\partial CS^{NR}/\partial t=[q(1+b)(2b)^{2}a\{4b^{2}(3bq)\}cb^{3}q(1q)m_{L}(43b^{2})t]/ \{(4b^{2})q\}^{2}<\left. \partial CS^{NR}/\partial t\right _{a= \underline{a}}=b\{( 1q) ( cqm_{L}) +t\}( 2+b) /\{(4b^{2})q\}^{2}<0\).
(ii) Firms’ profits: In the RR case, we have \(\partial ^{2}\varPi _{D}^{RR}/(\partial a\partial t)=2b\{2b( 2q) \}/[q\{4( 2q) b^{2}\}^{2}]>0\) and
where \(\gamma \equiv 2( 1b) ( 2b) q\). Suppose \( 2( 1b) /( 2b) \ge q\) holds so that \(\gamma \ge 0\) holds. In this case, \(\left. \partial (\varPi _{D}^{RR})/\partial t\right _{a=\underline{a}}>0\) and so \(\partial (\varPi _{D}^{RR})/\partial t>0\) hold irrespective of the other parameter values. Alternatively, suppose \(2( 1b) /( 2b) <q\) holds so that \(\gamma <0\) holds. In this case, \(\left. \partial (\varPi _{D}^{RR})/\partial t\right _{a=\underline{a }}<0\) holds if c and \(m_{L}\) are sufficiently small and t and \(m_{H}\) are sufficiently large. This means that \(\partial (\varPi _{D}^{RR})/\partial t<0\) can hold if a, q, c, and \(m_{L}\) are small and t and \(m_{H}\) are large. Regarding the profit of firm F, we have \(\partial \varPi _{F}^{RR}/\partial t=2qx_{F}^{RR}(\partial x_{F}^{RR}/\partial t)<0\) because \(\partial x_{F}^{RR}/\partial t<0\) holds in the RR equilibrium.
In the OR and the NR equilibrium, since \(\partial x_{D}^{OR}/\partial t>0\) and \(\partial x_{D}^{NR}/\partial t>0\) hold, we have \(\partial \varPi _{D}^{OR}/\partial t=2x_{D}^{OR}(\partial x_{D}^{OR}/\partial t)>0\) and \( \partial \varPi _{D}^{NR}/\partial t=2x_{D}^{NR}(\partial x_{D}^{NR}/\partial t)>0\). Regarding firm F, since \(\partial x_{F}^{OR}/\partial t<0\) and \(\partial x_{F}^{NR}/\partial t<0\) hold, we have \(\partial \varPi _{F}^{OR}/\partial t=2x_{F}^{OR}(\partial x_{F}^{OR}/\partial t)<0\) and \(\partial \varPi _{F}^{NR}/\partial t=2q^2x_{F}^{NR}(\partial x_{F}^{NR}/\partial t)<0\).
(iii) World welfare: In the OR equilibrium, \(\partial (WW^{OR})/\partial t=[( 2b) ^{2}\{ac( 1q) m_{L}\}+( 43b^{2}) t]/( 4b^{2}) ^{2}<0\) holds. In the NR equilibrium, \(\partial (WW^{NR})/\partial t=[aq( b2) ^{2}\{4(1bq)+b^{2}\}c+(43b^{2})t+4bq(1q) m_{L}]/\{q^{2} (4b^{2}) ^{2}\}\) holds. Hence, \(\partial (WW^{NR})/\partial t\ge 0\) holds if \(a\le \widehat{a}\equiv [\{4( 1bq)+b^{2}\}c(43b^{2}) t4b(1q) qm_{L}]/\{q( 2b) ^{2}\}\) holds. Since \(\widehat{a}\) \(\underline{a}\) \(=( 2+b) [b(1q)(cqm_{l})( 43b) t]/\{q( 2b) ^{2}\}\) holds, \(\widehat{a}>\) \(\underline{a}\) is satisfied if c is large and \(m_{L}\) and t are small. Putting it all together, \(\partial (WW^{NR})/\partial t\ge 0\) holds if c is large enough and a, \(m_{L}\), and t are small enough. Otherwise, \(\partial (WW^{NR})/\partial t<0\) holds.
In the RR equilibrium, we have \(\partial (WW^{RR})/\partial t=B_{5}/[q^{2}\{4b^{2}( 2q) \}^{2}]\) where \(B_{5}\equiv \) \( aq\{2( 2+b) ( 1b) ^{2}+( 2+2b3b^{2}) bq( 1b) b^{2}q^{2}\}+\{4( 1b^{2}) 2( 1b) ( 4+bb^{2}) q( 1b) ( 3b+2) bq^{2}b^{3}q^{3}\}c+( 44b^{2}+b^{2}q^{2}) t2( 1q) (42b^{2}+b^{2}q)qm_{H}+( 1q) \{2( 3b^{2}) ( 23b^{2}) qb^{2}q^{2}\}bqm_{L}\). Hence, \( B_{5}\le 0\) holds if \(a<\widehat{a}^{\prime }\equiv [\{4( 1b^{2}) 2( 1b) ( 4+bb^{2}) q( 1b) ( 3b+2) bq^{2}b^{3}q^{3}\}c+( 44b^{2}+b^{2}q^{2}) t2(1q)(42b^{2}+b^{2}q)qm_{H}+( 1q) \{2( 3b^{2}) ( 23b^{2}) qb^{2}q^{2}\}bqm_{L}]/[q\{2( 2+b) ( 1b) ^{2}+(2+2b3b^{2})bq( 1b) b^{2}q^{2}\}]\) is satisfied. Since we have \(\widehat{a}^{\prime }\) \(\underline{a}\) \( =\{4b^{2}( 2q) \}[2( 1q) ( 2b) qm_{H}\{4( 1b) +bq\}\{( 1q) c+t\}b( 1q) ( 2q) qm_{L}]/[q( 2b) \{2( 2+b) ( 1b) ^{2}+(2+2b3b^{2})bq( 1b) b^{2}q^{2}\}]\) and \(\left. (\widehat{a}^{\prime }\underline{a})\right _{m_{H}=c,t=0,m_{L}=0}=[q( 43b) 4( 1b) ](1q)\{4b^{2}( 2q) \}c/[q(2b)\{2(2+b)(1b)^{2}+(2+2b3b^{2})bq( 1b) b^{2}q^{2}\}]\) , \(\widehat{a}^{\prime }>\underline{a}\) holds if t and \(m_{L}\) are sufficiently small, \(m_{H}\) is sufficiently large, and q is large enough to satisfy \(q>4( 1b) /( 43b) \). In sum, \(\partial (WW^{RR})/\partial t\ge 0\) holds if a, t, and \(m_{L}\) are small enough and \(m_{H}\) and q are large enough. Otherwise, \(\partial (WW^{RR})/\partial t<0\) holds.
1.10 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) To prove the proposition, we provide a numerical example in which trade liberalization reduces the imports of good F, hurts consumers and firm F , and worsens world welfare. Parameters are set at \(a=20\), \(c=5\), \(m_{H}=2\), \(m_{L}=1\), \(q=0.5\), \(b=0.5\), and \(K_{D}=18\). Under the parameterization, we have \(t_{D}=0.35634\) and \(\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,0)=22.08<\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{D})=22.401\).
(a) The shift from the NR to the RR equilibrium by a tariff reduction. Consider a tariff reduction from \(t_{0}=0.4\) to \(t_{1}=0\) and suppose \( K_{F}^{0}>\min [\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,0),\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{D})]\) holds. Since \(t_{0}>t_{D}\) holds, \(\Delta \varPi _{F}(N,t_{0})<\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{D})\) is satisfied. Because \(\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,0)<\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{D})<K_{F}^{0}\) holds under the parameterization, the equilibrium service regime becomes the NR equilibrium at \(t=t_{0}\) and the RR equilibrium at \(t=t_{1}\). The changes in the amount of imports, consumer surplus, the profit of each firm, and world welfare are respectively given by \(\left. x_{F}^{RR}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. x_{F}^{NR}\right _{t=t_{0}}=2.429\,4<0\), \(\left. CS^{RR}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. CS^{NR}\right _{t=t_{0}}=1.057\,4<0\), \((\left. \varPi _{D}^{RR}\right _{t=t_{1}}K_{D})\left. \varPi _{D}^{NR}\right _{t=t_{0}}=0.31014>0\), \( \left. \varPi _{F}^{RR}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. \varPi _{F}^{NR}\right _{t=t_{0}}=2.\,6552<0\), and \(\left. WW^{RR}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. WW^{NR}\right _{t=t_{0}}=5.7812<0\).
(b) The shift from the OR to the RR equilibrium by a tariff reduction. Suppose \(K_{F}^{0}=22.2\) and a tariff reduction from \(t_{0}=0.2\) to \(t_{1}=0\). Since \(t_{0}<t_{D}\) and \(\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,0)=22.08<K_{F}^{0}<\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{1})=22.\,259\) hold, the equilibrium regimes under \(t=t_{1}\) and under \(t=t_{0}\) respectively become the OR equilibrium and the RR equilibrium. The changes in the amount of imports, consumer surplus, the profit of each firm, and world welfare are respectively given by \(\left. x_{F}^{RR}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. x_{F}^{OR}\right _{t=t_{0}}=2.429\,4<0\), \(\left. CS^{RR}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. CS^{OR}\right _{t=t_{0}}=15.\,564<0\), \((\left. \varPi _{D}^{RR}\right _{t=t_{1}}K_{D})\left. \varPi _{D}^{OR}\right _{t=t_{0}}=8.696\,8>0\), \( \left. \varPi _{F}^{RR}\right _{t=t_{1}}( \left. \varPi _{F}^{OR}\right _{t=t_{0}}K_{F}) =4.0286<0\), and \(\left. WW^{RR}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. WW^{OR}\right _{t=t_{0}}=12.035<0\).
As these numerical examples show, there exists a case where the tariff reduction reduces the imports, decreases consumer surplus and the profits of the foreign firm, increases the profits of the domestic firm, and worsens world welfare.
(ii) If a tariff reduction from \(t_{0}\in (t_{1},\overline{t})\) to \(t_{1}\in [0,t_{D})\) given \(K_{F}=K_{F}^{0}\) increases the imports, consumer surplus, and the profits of firm F, and improves world welfare, we have the same effects for all \(K_{F}\in (K_{D},K_{F}^{0}]\). In this case, \( \widetilde{K}_{F}=K_{F}^{0}\) holds.
Next consider the case where \(\widetilde{K}_{F}=K_{F}^{0}\) does not hold. Suppose the case where the tariff reduction improves world welfare at \( K_{F}=K_{F}^{0}\). Note that if \(K_{F}\) satisfies \(K_{F}<\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{1})\), the postliberalization regime is the OR equilibrium. By combining Propositions 2 and 4, \(K_{F}<\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{1})\) is necessary and sufficient so that the tariff reduction always increases the imports, consumer surplus, and the profits of firm F irrespective of the preliberalization service regime. Hence, we have \(\widetilde{K}_{F}=\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{1})\) in this case.
Alternatively, suppose the tariff reduction worsens world welfare at \( K_{F}=K_{F}^{0}\). In this case, \(K_{F}<\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{1})\) is necessary but may not be sufficient for a welfareimproving tariff reduction. If \(\partial WW^{NR}/\partial t\le 0\) holds, \(K_{F}<\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{1})\) becomes a sufficient condition and so \(\widetilde{K} _{F}=\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{1})\) holds. If \(\partial WW^{NR}/\partial t>0\) holds, on the other hand, we need to derive \(K_{F}^{\prime }\) such that \( \left. WW^{OR}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. WW^{NR}\right _{t=t_{0}}=0\) holds at \(K_{F}=K_{F}^{\prime }\). Naturally, we have \(\left. WW^{OR}\right _{t=t_{1}}>\left. WW^{NR}\right _{t=t_{0}}\) for all \( K_{F}<K_{F}^{\prime }\). Furthermore, if \(t_{0}\ge t_{D}\) and \(K_{F}<\Delta \varPi _{F}(N,t_{0})\) hold or \(t_{0}<t_{D}\) and \(K_{F}<\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{0})\) hold, the preliberalization regime is also the OR equilibrium so that the tariff reduction necessarily increases world welfare given that \(K_{F}<\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{1})\) holds.
In summary, when the tariff reduction worsens world welfare at \( K_{F}=K_{F}^{0}\), it becomes welfareimproving (a) for all \( K_{F}<\widetilde{K}_{F}=\max [K_{F}^{\prime }, \Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{1}),\Delta \varPi _{F}(N,t_{0})]\) when \(t_{0}\ge t_{D}\) holds, and (b) for all \(K_{F}<\widetilde{K}_{F}=\max [K_{F}^{\prime },\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{1}),\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t_{0})]\) when \(t_{0}<t_{D}\) holds. As long as \(K_{D}\) is small enough to satisfy \(K_{D}<\Delta \varPi _{F}(E,t)\) for all t , we can always find a unique level of \(\widetilde{K}_{F}\) in \(K_{F}\in (K_{D},K_{F}^{0}]\).
1.11 The equilibrium repairs in the presence of ISOs
In the monopolyISO case, the ISO’s maximization problem at stage 3 coincides with that of firm D in the RR case. Hence, the firstorder condition is given by (7). Suppose \(\lambda >0\). This implies \(\widehat{R} _{F}=( 1q) x_{F}\) and \(r=V_{F}( x_{D},x_{F}) \) at stage 3 where r is the service price set by the ISO. At stage 2, by the consumer’s utility maximization as to \(x_{D}\) and \(x_{F}\), the inverse demand functions are given by \(p_{D}=V_{D}(x_{D},x_{F})\) and \( p_{F}=V_{F}(x_{D},x_{F})( 1q) r=qV_{F}( x_{D},x_{F}) \). Each firm’s maximization problems are respectively given by \( \max _{x_{D}}\varPi _{D}=\{V_{D}(x_{D},x_{F})c( 1q) m_{L}\}x_{D}\) and \(\max _{x_{F}}\varPi _{F}=\{qV_{F}(x_{D},x_{F})( c+t) \}x_{F}\). By the firstorder conditions, the optimal sales of the two firms, \( (x_{D}^{ISO},x_{F}^{ISO})\), must satisfy:
By the above equations and \(c\ge m_{H}\), \(\lambda =V_{F}(x_{D}^{ISO},x_{F}^{ISO})+V_{FF}(x_{D}^{ISO},x_{F}^{ISO})x_{F}^{ISO}m_{H}=(c+t)/qm_{H}>0 \) holds. Therefore, \((x_{D}^{ISO},x_{F}^{ISO})\) and \(R_{F}^{ISO}=( 1q) x_{F}^{ISO}\) actually constitute an equilibrium.
Suppose \(\lambda =0\). This means \(R_{F}<( 1q) x_{F}\) and \( V_{F}(x_{D},qx_{F}+R_{F})+V_{FF}(x_{D},qx_{F}+R_{F})R_{F}=m_{H}\) hold. Since we have assumed that \(V_{FF}(d_{D},d_{F})<0\) and \(2V_{FF}(d_{D},d_{F})+( \partial V_{FF}(d_{D},d_{F})/\partial d_{F})d_{F}<0\) hold, \( 2V_{FF}(d_{D},d_{F})+(\partial V_{FF}(d_{D},d_{F})/\partial d_{F})D<0\) holds for any \(D\in (0,d_{F}]\). With this property, by Eq. 8, and \(c\ge m_{H}\), we have:
This inequality contradicts \( V_{F}(x_{D},qx_{F}+R_{F})+V_{FF}(x_{D},qx_{F}+R_{F})R_{F}=m_{H}\). Hence, \( \lambda =0\) cannot hold in equilibrium.
1.12 Proof of Proposition 6
Since \(\partial (\varPi _{ISO}) /(\partial a\partial t)=( 1q) b^{2}/\{q( 4b^{2})(2+b) \}<0\) holds, we have \(\partial \varPi _{ISO} / \partial t<\left. \partial \varPi _{ISO}/\partial t\right _{a=\underline{a}}=2( 1q) (c+tm_{H}q)/\{q^{2}( 4b^{2}) \}<0\). When \(\left. \varPi _{ISO}\right _{t=0}>K_{D}\) is satisfied, there exists a unique cutoff level of t, denoted by \(t_{ISO}\), such that \(\varPi _{ISO}>K_{ISO}\) holds for \(t\in [0,t_{ISO})\), \(\varPi _{ISO}=K_{ISO}\) holds at \(t=t_{ISO}\), and \( \varPi _{ISO}<K_{ISO}\) holds for \(t\in (t_{ISO},\overline{t})\). Because \(\varPi _{D}^{ISO}=\varPi _{D}^{NR}\) holds, possible entry of ISOs does not affect \( \Delta \varPi _{D}\) and so the level of \(t_{D}\).
Given that \(\Delta \varPi _{F}\le K_{F}\) and \(\left. \varPi _{ISO}\right _{t=0}>K_{ISO}\) hold, the equilibrium of the entry game becomes (i) the NR equilibrium if \(\max [t_{ISO},t_{D}]\le t\) holds, because \(\varPi _{ISO}\le K_{ISO}\) and \(\Delta \varPi _{D}\le K_{D}\) hold, (ii) the RR equilibrium if \(t_{ISO}\le t<t_{D}\) holds, because \(\varPi _{ISO}\le K_{ISO}\) and \(\Delta \varPi _{D}>K_{D}\) hold, (iii) the ISO equilibrium if \(t_{D}\le t<t_{ISO}\) holds because \(\varPi _{ISO}>K_{ISO}\) and \(\Delta \varPi _{D}\le K_{D}\) hold, and (iv) either the ISO equilibrium or the RR equilibrium if \(0\le t<\min [t_{ISO},t_{D}]\) holds, because \(\varPi _{ISO}>K_{ISO}\) and \(\Delta \varPi _{D}>K_{D}\) mean that both firm D and ISOs have an incentive to enter the aftermarket for good F , and at most a single firm or a single ISO enters in equilibrium due to the price competition in the market.
1.13 The outsourcing of repair services
Let us first consider the OSD equilibrium. The profits of firm D and firm F (the gross of the fixed cost) under the outsourcing are respectively given by
In stage 1, because the outsourced firm commits to provide free repair services, other firms do not enter the repair market. In stage 2, firms determines \(x_{i}\) to maximize \(\varPi _{i}\) given \(\omega ^{D}\). The equilibrium firms’ profits are denoted by \(\varPi _{i}^{OS,D}(\omega ^{D})\) (\( i=D,F\)). By accepting firm F’s offer, the profit of firm D becomes \(\varPi _{D}^{OS,D}K_{D}\), while it becomes \(\overline{\pi }_{D}\) if it rejects the offer. Because firm F makes a takeitorleaveit offer, it has the maximum bargaining power over firm D. It means that firm F sets \(\varOmega ^{D}\) such that firm D becomes indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer and \(\varPi _{D}^{OS,D}(\omega ^{D})K_{D}+\varOmega ^{D}=\overline{\pi } _{D}\) holds. Namely, firm F offers \(\varOmega ^{D}=\overline{\pi }_{D}\{\varPi _{D}^{OS,D}(\omega ^{D})K_{D}\}\). Given this, firm F’s gains from the service outsourcing (gross of the fixed cost of managing contract, \(K_{OS}\)) become \(\Delta \varPi _{F}^{OS,D}(\omega ^{D})\equiv \varPi _{F}^{OS,D}(\omega ^{D})\overline{\pi }_{F}\varOmega ^{D}=\varPi _{F}^{OS,D}(\omega ^{D})+\varPi _{k}^{OS,D}(\omega ^{D})(\overline{\pi }_{F}+\overline{\pi }_{k})K_{k}\). Note that \(\Delta \varPi _{F}^{OS,D}(\omega ^{D})\) becomes the joint surplus of the outsourcing firm and the outsourced firm from service outsourcing. Then, firm F sets \(\omega ^{D}\) so that it maximizes \(\Delta \varPi _{F}^{OS,D}(\omega ^{D})\). The equilibrium perunit fee and gains from service outsourcing are respectively given by \(\widetilde{\omega } ^{D}=[(2b)^{2}( b+2q) ( ac) +(1q)\{2( 4b^{2}) m_{H}(4+b^{2}8q)bm_{L}\}+2\{(2q)b^{2}4q\}t]/\{2( 1q) ( 43b^{2}+4q+b^{2}q) \}\) and \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,D}=\Delta \varPi _{F}^{OS,D}(\widetilde{\omega }^{D})\). We can confirm that \(\widetilde{\omega }^{D}\) is always positive.^{Footnote 30} The equilibrium consumer surplus and world welfare are denoted by \( CS^{OS,D}\) and \(WW^{OS,D}\).
Second, we consider the OSISO equilibrium. The profit of the ISO (gross of the fixed cost) under service outsourcing is given by \(\varPi _{ISO}^{OS,ISO}=( \omega ^{ISO}m_{H}) (1q)x_{F}\). The profit of firm F is obtained by replacing \(\omega ^{D}\) with \(\omega ^{ISO}\) in (14), while that of firm D is given by \(\varPi _{D}=[p_{D}\{c+t+( 1q) m_{L}\}]x_{D}\). The equilibrium levels of \(x_{D}\) and \(x_{F}\) become the same as those under the outsourcing to firm D, because \( \partial \varPi _{D}/\partial x_{D}\) and \(\partial \varPi _{F}/\partial x_{F}\) are independent of whether the outsourced firm is firm D or an ISO. Therefore, \(\varPi _{F}^{OS,D}( \omega ^{D}) =\varPi _{F}^{OS,ISO}( \omega ^{ISO}) \) holds if \(\omega ^{D}=\omega ^{ISO}\), where \(\varPi _{i}^{OS,ISO}( \omega ^{ISO}) \) denote firm i’s (\(i\in \{D,F,ISO\}\)) equilibrium profit of this subgame, gross of the fixed cost and the fixed fee. The offered ISO accepts the service outsourcing if and only if \(\varPi _{F}^{OS,ISO}( \omega ^{ISO}) K_{ISO}+\varOmega ^{ISO}\ge \overline{\pi }_{ISO}\) holds. Then, firm F sets \(\varOmega ^{ISO}= \overline{\pi }_{ISO}\{\varPi _{F}^{OS,ISO}( \omega ^{ISO}) K_{ISO}\}\) and its profit gains (gross of \(K_{OS}\)) become \(\Delta \varPi _{F}^{OS,ISO}( \omega ^{ISO}) =\varPi _{F}^{OS,ISO}( \omega ^{ISO}) \overline{\pi }_{F}\varOmega ^{ISO}=\varPi _{F}^{OS,ISO}( \omega ^{ISO}) +\varPi _{ISO}^{OS,ISO}( \omega ^{ISO}) ( \overline{\pi }_{F}+\overline{\pi }_{ISO})K_{ISO}\). Firm F sets \(\omega ^{ISO}\) to maximize \(\Delta \varPi _{F}^{OS,ISO}( \omega ^{ISO}) \), and the optimal level is given by \(\widetilde{\omega } ^{ISO}=[( 2b) b^{2}( ac) (1q)\{( 4b^{2}) ( 2+b) m_{H}+b^{3}m_{L}\}+2b^{2}t]/\{4( 1q) ( 2b^{2}) \}\). An increase in \(\omega ^{ISO}\) does not directly affect the joint profit of firm F and the ISO, \(\varPi _{F}^{OS,ISO}( \omega ^{ISO}) +\varPi _{ISO}^{OS,ISO}( \omega ^{ISO}) =\{p_{F}(c+t)(1q)m_{H}\}x_{F}\), but it indirectly affects the joint profit by changing the equilibrium level of firms’ sales. Although \(\widetilde{\omega }^{ISO}\) can be either positive or negative, we have \(\varPi _{ISO}^{OS,ISO}(\widetilde{\omega }^{ISO})<0\) because \(\widetilde{\omega } ^{ISO}<m_{H}\) always holds. We call the equilibrium under service outsourcing to firm D the OSISO equilibrium. The equilibrium consumer surplus and world welfare are denoted by \(CS^{OS,ISO}\) and \(WW^{OS,ISO}\).
At \(t=t_{0}\), the NR equilibrium is realized without service outsourcing. This means that \(\overline{\pi }_{F}=\varPi _{F}^{NR}\), \(\overline{\pi } _{D}=\varPi _{D}^{NR}\), and \(\overline{\pi }_{ISO}=0\) hold. Given this, we have \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,D}=\varPi _{F}^{OS,D}(\widetilde{\omega } ^{D})+\varPi _{D}^{OS,D}(\widetilde{\omega }^{D})(\varPi _{F}^{NR}+\varPi _{D}^{NR})K_{D}\) and \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,ISO}=\varPi _{F}^{OS,ISO}(\widetilde{\omega }^{ISO})+\varPi _{ISO}^{OS,ISO}(\widetilde{ \omega }^{ISO})\varPi _{F}^{NR}K_{ISO}\).
At \(t=t_{1}\) (\(\in \min [t_{ISO},t_{D}]\)), either the RR equilibrium or the ISO equilibrium is realized without service outsourcing. If the firms anticipate that the RR equilibrium is realized, we have \(\overline{\pi } _{F}=\varPi _{F}^{RR}\), \(\overline{\pi }_{D}=\varPi _{D}^{RR}K_{D}\), and \( \overline{\pi }_{ISO}=0\). Then, the gains from outsourcing become \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,D}=\varPi _{F}^{OS,D}(\widetilde{\omega }^{D})+\varPi _{D}^{OS,D}(\widetilde{\omega } ^{D})(\varPi _{F}^{RR}+\varPi _{D}^{RR})\) and \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,ISO}=\varPi _{F}^{OS,ISO}(\widetilde{\omega }^{ISO})+\varPi _{ISO}^{OS,ISO}(\widetilde{\omega }^{ISO})\varPi _{F}^{RR}K_{ISO}\). If the firms anticipate that the ISO equilibrium is realized, we have \( \overline{\pi }_{F}=\varPi _{F}^{ISO}\), \(\overline{\pi }_{D}=0\), and \(\overline{ \pi }_{ISO}=\varPi _{ISO}K_{ISO}\). The firm F’s gains from service outsourcing become: \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,D}=\varPi _{F}^{OS,D}( \widetilde{\omega }^{D})+\varPi _{D}^{OS,D}(\widetilde{\omega }^{D})\varPi _{F}^{ISO}K_{D}\) and \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,ISO}=\varPi _{F}^{OS}( \widetilde{\omega }^{ISO})+\varPi _{ISO}^{OS,ISO}(\widetilde{\omega } ^{ISO})(\varPi _{F}^{ISO}+\varPi _{ISO})\).
The OSD equilibrium is realized if \(\max \left[ \Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,D},\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,ISO}\right] =\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,D}>K_{OS}\) holds and the OSISO equilibrium is attained if \(\max \left[ \Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,D},\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,ISO}\right] =\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,ISO}>K_{OS}\) holds. Otherwise, firm F does not offer any outsourcing contract and the outside option of service outsourcing becomes the equilibrium outcome.
Now, we discuss the effect of a tariff reduction on consumer surplus. Because \(\partial ^{2}CS^{OS,D}/\partial a\partial t=(2b)(43b^{2}+2b^{2}q+4bq)/\{2(4q+b^{2}q3b^{2}+4)^{2}\}<0\) and \( \partial ^{2}CS^{OS,ISO}/\partial a\partial t=(86b^{2}+b^{3})/\{8(2b^{2})^{2}\}<0\) means that \(\partial CS^{OS,k}/\partial t\) is decreasing in a, we have \(\left. ( \partial CS^{OS,D}/\partial t) \right _{a=\underline{a}}=[( 1q) ^{2}( 43b^{2}+2b^{2}q+4bq) c+( 1q) \{( 43b^{2}) q(cm_{H})+2( 2+b) bq^{2}(cm_{L})\}+(43b^{2}4q+5b^{2}q+4bq)t]/\{q( 4+4q+b^{2}q3b^{2}) ^{2}\}<0\) and \(\left. ( \partial CS^{OS,ISO}/\partial t) \right _{a=\underline{a} }=[(86b^{2}+b^{3})( 1q) ^{2}c+( 1q) \{(43b^{2})(2b)q(cm_{H})+2(2b^{2})bq(cm_{L}) \}+(86b^{2}+b^{3}8q+6b^{2}q3b^{3}q+4bq)t]/\{4(2b)(2b^{2})^{2}q\}<0\). Therefore, trade liberalization always increase consumer surplus within the OSD equilibrium and the OSISO equilibrium.
Trade liberalization, however, may shift the equilibrium regime. We have \( CS^{OS,ISO}CS^{NR}=C_{1}C_{2}/32( 4b^{2}) ^{2}( 2b^{2}) ^{2}q^{2}\) where \(C_{1}\equiv ( 2b) b^{2}qa+(84b^{2}8q+2b^{2}q+b^{3}q)c( 1q) \{2q( 4b^{2}) m_{H}+b^{3}qm_{L}\}+2( 42b^{2}4q+b^{2}q) t\) and \( C_{2}\equiv ( 2b) (32+16b28b^{2}8b^{3}+5b^{4})qa(3240b^{2}+12b^{4}32q+32b^{2}q12b^{3}q6b^{4}q+5b^{5}q)c( 1q) \{2( 4b^{2}) ( 43b^{2}) qm_{H}+( 125b^{2}) b^{3}qm_{L}\}2( 43b^{2}) ( 42b^{2}+4qb^{2}q) t \). Both \(C_{1}\) and \(C_{2}\) are increase in a and \(\left. ( C_{1}) \right _{a=\underline{a}}=2( 1q) ( 4b^{2}) ( c+tqm_{H}) >0\) and \(\left. ( C_{2}) \right _{a=\underline{a}}=2( 2+b) [( 1q) ^{2}(8+4b6b^{2}b^{3})c+(1q)\{( 2b) ( 43b^{2}) q(cm_{H})+( 2b^{2}) 4bq(cm_{L})+(8+4b6b^{2}b^{3}8q+6b^{2}q3b^{3}q+4bq)t]>0\). hold. This means that \(CS^{OS,ISO}>CS^{NR}\) always holds evaluated at the same level of t. It is ambiguous, however, whether \(CS^{OS,D}\) is larger or smaller than \(CS^{NR}\). If \(CS^{OS,D}<CS^{NR}\) holds, the change from the NR equilibrium to the OSD equilibrium hurts consumer surplus. We confirm that \(CS^{OS,D}\) can be even lower than \(CS^{RR}\).
First, we use a numerical example to prove there is a case where the trade liberalization shifts the equilibrium from the NR equilibrium to the OSD equilibrium. We set \(K_{D}=K_{ISO}=30\) and \(K_{OS}=5\) and consider a tariff reduction from \(t_{0}=4\) to \(t_{1}=0\). Here, the basic parameters are set as \(a=40\), \(c=5\), \(m_{H}=4\), \(m_{L}=2\), \(q=0.8\), \(b=0.8\). Then the cutoff levels of tariffs become \(t_{D}=0.31288\) and \(t_{ISO}=3.0352\). At \( t=t_{0}\), \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,D}=1.8348\) and \(\Delta \widetilde{ \varPi }_{F}^{OS,ISO}=10.365\), meaning that \(\max [\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,D},\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,ISO}]<K_{OS}\) holds and the NR equilibrium is initially attained. At \(t_{1}=0\), if the firms anticipate that the ISO equilibrium is realized without service outsourcing, then we have \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,D}=19.606\) and \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,ISO}=6.616\,8\). If the firms anticipate that the RR equilibrium is realized without service outsourcing, we have \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,D}=10.278\) and \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,ISO}=0.96393\). Therefore, \(\max [\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,D},\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,ISO}]=\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,D}>K_{OS}\) holds under the parameterization and the OSD equilibrium is realized at \(t=t_{0}\). This trade liberalization hurts consumers and worsens world welfare because we have \(\left. CS^{OS,D}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. CS^{NR}\right _{t=t_{0}}=30.264\) and \(\left. WW^{OS,D}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. WW^{NR}\right _{t=t_{0}}=57.759\). Furthermore, \(\left. CS^{OS,D}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. CS^{RR}\right _{t=t_{1}}=51.671\) means that the outsourcing to firm D hurts consumers more than the “voluntary” repairs by firm D.
Second, we consider the case where the OSISO equilibrium is initially realized. We set parameters as \(a=30\), \(c=5\), \(m_{H}=4\), \(m_{L}=2\), \(q=0.5\), \(b=0.5\) with keeping the level of the fixed costs being the same as the above example. Then, we have \(t_{D}=3.7204\) and \(t_{ISO}=3.67\). We consider the same tariff reduction from \(t_{0}=4\) to \(t_{1}=0\). At \(t=t_{0}\), \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,D}=6.8828\) and \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,ISO}=8.0457\), meaning that \(\max [\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,D},\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,ISO}]=\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,ISO}>K_{OS}\) holds and the OSISO equilibrium is the initial outcome. At \(t=t_{1}\), if the firms anticipate that the RR equilibrium is realized without service outsourcing, we have \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,D}=4.0329\) and \(\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,ISO}=22.74\) and \( \max [\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,D},\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,ISO}]=\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,ISO}>K_{OS}\) means that the postliberalization outcome is still the OSISO equilibrium. In this case, trade liberalization benefits consumers and it also improves world welfare because we have \(\left. WW^{OS,ISO}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. WW^{OS,ISO}\right _{t=t_{0}}=16.082\).
Alternatively, if the firms anticipate that the ISO equilibrium is realized without service outsourcing at \(t_{1}=0\), we have \(\Delta \varPi _{F}^{OS,D}=18.694\) and \(\Delta \varPi _{F}^{OS,ISO}=4.4203\). Then, we have \( \max [\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,D},\Delta \widetilde{\varPi } _{F}^{OS,ISO}]=\Delta \widetilde{\varPi }_{F}^{OS,D}>K_{OS}\) and so trade liberalization shifts the equilibrium from the OSISO equilibrium to the OSD equilibrium. We have \(\left. CS^{OS,D}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. CS^{OS,ISO}\right _{t=t_{0}}=21.825\) and \(\left. WW^{OS,D}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. WW^{OS,ISO}\right _{t=t_{0}}=19.\,676\). As above, we also have \(\left. CS^{OS,D}\right _{t=t_{1}}\left. CS^{RR}\right _{t=t_{0}}=7.7734\).
These numerical examples suggest that there is a case where trade liberalization that shifts the equilibrium from the NR equilibrium or the OSISO equilibrium to the OSD equilibrium hurts consumers and worsens world welfare.
1.14 The repurchase of good F
Let \(x_{F}^{\prime }\) and \(x_{F}^{\prime \prime }\) respectively denote the amount of good F that is originally purchased and that of good F that is repurchased. Likewise, let \(p_{F}^{\prime }\) and \(p_{F}^{\prime \prime }\) respectively denote the original price of good F and the repurchase price of good F.
Suppose firm F cannot differentiate between the price of good F that is originally purchased and that of good F that is repurchased: \( p_{F}^{\prime \prime }=p_{F}^{\prime }\). This case corresponds to the situation in which firm F cannot reexport good F immediately after consumers find the broken units. In stage 3, each consumer maximizes \( V(x_{D},qx_{F}^{\prime }+qx_{F}^{\prime \prime })p_{F}^{\prime }x_{F}^{\prime \prime }\) with respect to \(x_{F}^{\prime \prime }\). The demand for the repurchase of good F is determined by \(p_{F}^{\prime }=qV_{F}(x_{D},qx_{F}^{\prime }+qx_{F}^{\prime \prime })\). In stage 2, the consumer maximizes \(V(x_{D},qx_{F}^{\prime }+q\widetilde{x}_{F}^{\prime \prime })+Z\) with respect to \(x_{D}\) and \(x_{F}^{\prime }\), subject to \( p_{D}x_{D}+p_{F}^{\prime }x_{F}^{\prime }\le Ip_{F}^{\prime }x_{F}^{\prime \prime }\). The demand for good D and that for good F are respectively given by \(p_{D}=V_{D}(x_{D},qx_{F}^{\prime }+qx_{F}^{\prime \prime })\) and \( p_{F}^{\prime }=qV_{F}(x_{D},qx_{F}^{\prime }+qx_{F}^{\prime \prime })\). Given the demand functions, firm F determines the supply of good F, \( x_{F}=x_{F}^{\prime }+x_{F}^{\prime \prime }\). The maximization problems of the two firms in stage 2 are written as:
These maximization problems coincide with those in the NR subgame. Analytically, the repurchase of good F in this case and the extra purchase of good F in the NR subgame are identical. Therefore, the equilibrium outcomes in the two cases become the same.
Alternatively, suppose firm F can set a different price for the repurchase of good F. In stage 3, each consumer maximizes \(V(x_{D},qx_{F}^{\prime }+qx_{F}^{\prime \prime })p_{F}^{\prime \prime }x_{F}^{\prime \prime }\) with respect to \(x_{F}^{\prime \prime }\) subject to \(x_{F}^{\prime \prime }\le (1q)x_{F}^{\prime }\). We have two cases: (i) all broken units are repurchased if \(qV_{F}(x_{D},qx_{F}^{\prime }+qx_{F}^{\prime \prime })\ge p_{F}^{\prime \prime }\) holds at \(x_{F}^{\prime \prime }=\left( 1q\right) x_{F}^{\prime }\), which means that \(V_{F}(x_{D},q(2q)x_{F}^{\prime })\ge p_{F}^{\prime \prime }\) holds, and (ii) only a fraction of the broken units is repurchased if \(qV_{F}(x_{D},qx_{F}^{\prime })\ge p_{F}^{\prime \prime }>qV_{F}(x_{D},qx_{F}^{\prime }+qx_{F}^{\prime \prime })\) holds.
Firstly, let us consider the case where all broken units are repurchased. The demand for the repurchase is given by \(x_{F}^{\prime \prime }=\left( 1q\right) x_{F}^{\prime }\), which is inelastic in \(p_{F}^{\prime \prime }\). In this case, the equilibrium price becomes \(\widetilde{p}_{F}^{\prime \prime }=qV_{F}(x_{D},q(2q)x_{F}^{\prime })\). In stage 2, the consumer anticipates \(x_{F}^{\prime \prime }=\left( 1q\right) x_{F}^{\prime }\) holds in stage 3 and she maximizes \(V(x_{D},q(2q)x_{F}^{\prime })+Z\) with respect to \(x_{D}\) and \(x_{F}^{\prime }\), subject to \(p_{D}x_{D}+p_{F}^{\prime }x_{F}^{\prime }\le I(1q)\widetilde{p}_{F}^{\prime \prime }x_{F}^{\prime } \). The demand for good D and that for good F are respectively given by \(p_{D}=V_{D}(x_{D},q(2q)x_{F}^{\prime })\) and \(p_{F}^{\prime }=qV_{F}(x_{D},q(2q)x_{F}^{\prime })\). Note that \(p_{F}^{\prime }= \widetilde{p}_{F}^{\prime \prime }\) holds in this case. Then, the maximization problems of the two firms in stage 2 are given by:
The firstorder conditions become:
The equilibrium sales, \((\widetilde{x}_{D},\widetilde{x}_{F}^{\prime })\), are obtained by solving these equations. By comparing the above firstorder conditions with the firstorder conditions in the NR subgame, we have \( \widetilde{x}_{D}=x_{D}^{NR}\) and \((2q)\widetilde{x}_{F}^{\prime }=x_{F}^{NR}\). This means that the equilibrium prices satisfy \(\widetilde{p} _{D}=p_{D}^{NR}\) and \(\widetilde{p}_{F}^{\prime }=\widetilde{p}_{F}^{\prime \prime }=p_{F}^{NR}\). The opportunity to repurchase good F reduces the amount of the initial sales of good F compared to the case without the repurchase, that is, \(\widetilde{x}_{F}^{\prime }<x_{F}^{NR}\). However, if the amount of the repurchase of good F is taken into account, the equilibrium total sales of firm F satisfy \(\widetilde{x}_{F}^{\prime }+(1q)\widetilde{x}_{F}^{\prime }=x_{F}^{NR}\).
Since both the equilibrium sales and the equilibrium prices of the two goods become identical across the two cases, the equilibrium firms’ profits, the equilibrium consumer surplus, and the equilibrium welfare in the presence of the repurchase coincide with those in the NR equilibrium.
Secondly, let us move on to the case where only a fraction of the broken units is replaced by the repurchased goods. In this case, the inverse demand for the repurchase is given by \(p_{F}^{\prime \prime }=qV_{F}(x_{D},q(x_{F}^{\prime }+x_{F}^{\prime \prime }))\). Since \(V_{FF}<0\) holds, the demand for the repurchase is decreasing in \(p_{F}^{\prime \prime } \). Firm F’s maximization problem is written by:
And the firstorder condition is given by:
In stage 2, the consumer maximizes \(V(x_{D},q(x_{F}^{\prime }+\widetilde{x} _{F}^{\prime \prime }))+Z\) with respect to \(x_{D}\) and \(x_{F}^{\prime }\), subject to \(p_{D}x_{D}+p_{F}^{\prime }x_{F}^{\prime }\le I\widetilde{p} _{F}^{\prime \prime }\widetilde{x}_{F}^{\prime \prime }\). The inverse demand for good D and that for good F are respectively given by \( p_{D}=V_{D}(x_{D},q(x_{F}^{\prime }+\widetilde{x}_{F}^{\prime \prime }))\) and \(p_{F}^{\prime }=qV_{F}(x_{D},q(x_{F}^{\prime }+\widetilde{x} _{F}^{\prime \prime }))\). Note that \(p_{F}^{\prime }=\widetilde{p} _{F}^{\prime \prime }\) holds. Given the demand functions, the maximization problems of the two firms at stage 2 are written as:
By differentiating \(\varPi _{F}\) with respect to \(x_{F}^{\prime }\) and using (15), we have:
The last inequality is due to the properties that \(V_{FF}<0\) and \(\partial \widetilde{x}_{F}^{\prime \prime }/\partial x_{F}^{\prime }>1\) hold. This means that the initial sales of good F must satisfy \(\widetilde{x} _{F}^{\prime }=0\), which contradicts the condition that \(x_{F}^{\prime \prime }\le (1q)x_{F}^{\prime }\) must hold. Therefore, this case cannot be the equilibrium outcome.
In sum, even if consumers have an option to replace the broken units of good F with the new units by repurchasing them from firm F who can resell the goods with a different price in the aftermarket, the equilibrium sales of the two goods, their equilibrium prices, and other equilibrium outcomes coincide with those in the NR equilibrium.
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Ishikawa, J., Morita, H. & Mukunoki, H. Trade liberalization and aftermarket services for imports. Econ Theory 62, 719–764 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s0019901509254
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s0019901509254