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Economic Theory

, Volume 59, Issue 3, pp 579–603 | Cite as

Collateral and the efficiency of monetary policy

  • M. Udara Peiris
  • Alexandros P. VardoulakisEmail author
Research Article

Abstract

This paper argues that in a monetary Real Business Cycle economy where a complete set of nominal contingent claims exist, the requirement to collateralize loans, alone, does not affect the equilibrium allocation when monetary policy is chosen optimally: The Pareto optimal allocation can be supported. A Friedman rule (r = 0), which would be optimal in the absence of collateral constraints, here is not. At the resulting prices, collateral constraints bind and the allocation is inefficient. However, positive interest rates (through an inflation tax on money balances) support the Pareto optimal allocation when the collateral constraint binds.

Keywords

Monetary policy Inflation Collateral 

JEL Classification

E13 E22 E41 E44 E52 E61 

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Copyright information

© © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg (Outside the USA) 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ICEF, NRU-Higher School of EconomicsMoscowRussian Federation
  2. 2.Federal Reserve Board of GovernorsWashingtonUSA

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