Economic Theory

, Volume 59, Issue 3, pp 509–525 | Cite as

Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries

Research Article

Abstract

An economy with ex ante markets for future delivery contingent on ex post spot market prices is considered. Since spot prices are publicly observed ex post, this framework bypasses the enforcement problems that may arise as a result of differential information about states of nature. Generically, the equilibria of an economy with price-contingent deliveries coincide with the equilibria of the corresponding economy with state-contingent deliveries. However, replacing state-contingent deliveries with price-contingent deliveries may generate additional equilibria and/or remove some equilibria. The perfect foresight hypothesis is crucial to avoid a severe problem of nonexistence of equilibrium.

Keywords

General equilibrium Price-contingent deliveries Differential information 

JEL Classification

C62 C72 D51 D82 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CEFUP and Faculdade de EconomiaUniversidade do PortoPortoPortugal

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