Economic Theory

, Volume 41, Issue 2, pp 345–357 | Cite as

Group contest success functions

  • Johannes MünsterEmail author
Exposita Note


This paper extends the axiomatic characterization of contest success functions of Skaperdas (Econ Theory 7:283–290, 1996) and Clark and Riis (Econ Theory 11:201–204, 1998) to contests between groups.


Contest Conflict Axiom Group 

JEL Classification

C70 D72 D74 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsFree University of BerlinBerlinGermany

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