Abstract
In the Nash Demand Game, each of the two players announces the share he demands of an amount of money that may be split between them. If the demands can be satisfied, they are; otherwise, neither player receives any money. This game has many pure-strategy equilibria. This paper characterizes mixed-strategy equilibria. The condition critical for an equilibrium is that players’ sets of possible demands be balanced. Two sets of demands are balanced if each demand in one set can be matched with a demand in the other set such that they sum to one. For Nash’s original game, a complete characterization is given of the equilibria in which both players’ expected payoffs are strictly positive. The findings are applied to the private provision of a discrete public good.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Malueg, D.A. Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash Demand Game. Econ Theory 44, 243–270 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0478-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0478-5