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Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information

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Abstract

This paper shows the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria for games with private and public information under general conditions. Under the additional assumptions of finiteness of action spaces and diffuseness and conditional independence of private information, a strong purification result is obtained for the mixed strategies in such games. As a corollary, the existence of pure-strategy equilibria follows.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Statistics and Applied Probability, National University of Singapore, 6 Science Drive 2, 117546, Singapore, Singapore

    Haifeng Fu

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  1. Haifeng Fu
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Correspondence to Haifeng Fu.

Additional information

I am very grateful to Yeneng Sun, Nicholas C. Yannelis and M. Ali Khan for helpful discussions and suggestions. I also wish to thank an anonymous referee whose comments led to many improvements in the paper.

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Fu, H. Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information. Econ Theory 37, 521–532 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0315-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0315-7

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