Economic Theory

, Volume 35, Issue 3, pp 523–538 | Cite as

A characterization of optimistic weighted Shapley rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems

  • Gustavo Bergantiños
  • Silvia Lorenzo-Freire
Research Article


In this paper we present an axiomatic characterization of the weighted Shapley value of the optimistic TU game associated with a minimum cost spanning tree problem. This characterization is based on two monotonicity properties, population monotonicity (if a new agent joint the society nobody is worse off) and the strong cost monotonicity (if the connection cost between any pair of agents increases nobody is better off), and weighted share of extra costs (the extra costs should be divided proportionally to the weights of the agents).


Minimum cost spanning tree problems Weighted Shapley values 

JEL Classification Numbers

C70 C71 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Research Group in Economic AnalysisUniversidade de VigoVigoSpain
  2. 2.Department of Statistics and Operations ResearchUniversidade de VigoVigoSpain

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