Economic Theory

, Volume 33, Issue 1, pp 121–143

Congestion allocation for distributed networks: an experimental study

Symposium

Abstract

This paper reports an experimental study of two prominent congestion and cost allocation mechanisms for distributed networks. We study the fair queuing (or serial) and the FIFO (or average cost pricing) mechanisms under two different treatments: a complete information treatment and a limited information treatment designed to simulate distributed networks. Experimental results show that the fair queuing mechanism performs significantly better than FIFO in all treatments in terms of efficiency, predictability measured as frequency of equilibrium play, and the speed of convergence to equilibrium.

Keywords

Serial cost sharing Congestion allocation Experiment 

JEL Classification Numbers

C91 D83 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Chen Y. (2003) An experimental study of the serial and average cost pricing mechanisms. J Public Econ 87: 2305–2335CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Chen Y., Gazzale R.S. (2004) When does learning in games generates convergence to nash equilibrium? the role of supermodularity in an experimental setting. Am Econ Rev 94: 1505–1535CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Chen Y., Khoroshilov Y. (2003) Learning under limited information. Games Econ Behav 44, 1–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Demers A., Keshav S., Shenker S. (1990) Analysis and simulation of a fair queueing algorithm. J Internetwork 1, 3–26Google Scholar
  5. Fischbacher U.: z-tree: A toolbox for readymade economic experiments—experimenter’s manual. University of Zurich Working Paper No. 21 (1999)Google Scholar
  6. Friedman E., Moulin H. (1999) Three methods to share joints costs or surplus. J Econ Theory 87, 275–312CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Friedman E., Shenker S.: Learning and implementation on the internet. Manuscript: Rutgers University, Department of Economics (1998)Google Scholar
  8. Gailmard S., Palfrey T. (2005) An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods. J Public Econ 89, 1361–1398CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Huck S., Sarin R.: Players with limited memory. Contrib Theoret Econ 4, Article 6 (2004)Google Scholar
  10. Kirman A.P., Vriend N.J. (2001) Evolving market structure: An ace model of price dispersion and loyalty. J Econ Dyn Control 25, 459–502CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. McKelvey R.D., McLennan A.M., Turocy T.L.: Gambit: software tools for game theory, version 0.2006.01.20. 2006. http://econweb.tamu.edu/gambitGoogle Scholar
  12. Milgrom P., Roberts J. (1990) Rationalizability, learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities. Econometrica 58: 1255–1277CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Moulin H., Shenker S. (1992) Serial cost sharing. Econometrica 60, 1009–1037CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Moulin H., Shenker S. (1994) Average cost pricing versus serial cost sharing: an axiomatic comparison. J Econ Theory 64, 178–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Rapoport A., Stein W., Parco J., Seale D. (2004) Strategic play in single-server queues with endogenously determined arrival times. J Econ Behavior 55, 67–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Razzolini L., Reksulak M., Dorsey R.: An experimental evaluation of the serial cost sharing rule. Manuscript: University of Mississippi (2007)Google Scholar
  17. Sarin R., Vahid F. (1999) Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice. Games Econ Behav 28, 294–309CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Shenker S. Making greed work in networks: a game-theoretic analysis of gateway service disciplines. Sigmetrics 241–242 (1990)Google Scholar
  19. Stoica I., Shenker S., Zhang H.: Core-stateless fair queueing: Achieving approximately fair bandwidth allocations in high speed networks. Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM, 118–130 (1998)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yan Chen
    • 1
  • Laura Razzolini
    • 2
  • Theodore L. Turocy
    • 3
  1. 1.School of InformationUniversity of MichiganAnn ArborUSA
  2. 2.Department of Economics, School of BusinessVirginia Commonwealth UniversityRichmondUSA
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsTexas A&M UniversityCollege StationUSA

Personalised recommendations