Abstract
We consider the problem of selecting alternatives from a set of feasible alternatives over which each agent is endowed with a strict preference. We show that there is one and only one rule that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, efficiency, tops-only, and reinforcement. The rule is known as plurality rule, which selects the alternative(s) most preferred by the largest number of agents.
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I would like to thank William Thomson for helpful suggestions and discussions. I am grateful to Biung-Ghi Ju, Hyungjun Kim, and Yan-An Hwang for detailed comments. I am also indebted to the Editor and an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions. As usual, I am responsible for any remaining deficiency.
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Yeh, CH. An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems. Economic Theory 34, 575–583 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0193-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0193-4