Abstract
This study reports a laboratory experiment wherein subjects play a hawk–dove game. We try to implement a correlated equilibrium with payoffs outside the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoffs by privately recommending play. We find that subjects are reluctant to follow certain recommendations. We are able to implement this correlated equilibrium, however, when subjects play against robots that always follow recommendations, including in a control treatment in which human subjects receive the robot “earnings.” This indicates that the lack of mutual knowledge of conjectures, rather than social preferences, explains subjects’ failure to play the suggested correlated equilibrium when facing other human players.
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We are grateful for financial support provided by the Purdue University Faculty Scholar program and the Asociación Méxicana de Cultura, as well as for the valuable research assistance provided by Shakun Datta and Marikah Mancini. We received helpful comments from Shurojit Chatterji, David Cooper, Arthur Schram, Ricard Torres, an anonymous referee, and from conference and seminar participants at Royal Holloway, the University of Amsterdam, Purdue University, the Economic Science Association and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory.
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Cason, T.N., Sharma, T. Recommended play and correlated equilibria: an experimental study. Economic Theory 33, 11–27 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0155-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0155-x