Abstract
We consider an OLG economy with endogenous investment in human capital. Heterogeneity in individual human capital levels is modelled by a distribution of innate ability across agents. This distribution is common knowledge but, at young age, no agent knows his/her ability. The production of human capital depends on each individual’s investment in education. This investment decision is taken only after observing a signal which is correlated to his/her true ability, and which is used for updating beliefs. Thus, a better information system affects the distribution of human capital in each generation. Assuming separable and identical preferences for all individuals, we derive the following results in equilibrium: (a) If the relative measure of risk aversion is less (more) than 1 then more information raises (reduces) income inequality. (b) When a risk sharing market is available better information results in higher inequality regardless of the measure risk aversion.
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We are grateful to Alex Cukierman, Zvi Eckstein, Yona Rubinstein and Daniel Tsiddon. An anonymous referee made extremely useful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development (GIF) is gratefully acknowledged.
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Eckwert, B., Zilcha, I. The Effect of Better Information on Income Inequality. Economic Theory 32, 287–307 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0120-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0120-8