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Children Crying at Birthday Parties. Why?

Abstract

We consider the problem of dividing a non-homogeneous one-dimensional continuum whose endpoints are topologically identified. Examples are the division of a birthday cake, the partition of a circular market, the assignment of sentry duty or medical call. We study the existence of rules satisfying requirements of efficiency, fairness (no-envy), and immunity to misrepresentation of preferences (strategy-proofness).

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Correspondence to William Thomson.

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Thomson, W. Children Crying at Birthday Parties. Why?. Economic Theory 31, 501–521 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0109-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0109-3

Keywords

  • Cake division
  • No-envy
  • Strategy-proofness

JEL Classification Numbers

  • D63
  • D70