Skip to main content

Welfare Reducing Polls

Economic Theory volume 31, pages 51–68 (2007)Cite this article

Abstract

We study costly majority voting when voters rationally anticipate others have similar preferences. The correlation in preferences lowers expected turnout because votes have a positive externality on those who abstain. We study the effects of the public release of information (polls) on participation levels. Polls raise expected turnout but reduce expected welfare because they stimulate the “wrong” group to participate resulting in a “toss-up” election. Our novel results highlight the adverse effects of providing information about the electorate’s preferences and may explain why some countries bar opinion polls close to an election date.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Access options

Buy single article

Instant access to the full article PDF.

USD 39.95

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

References

  • Baker L., Koestner R., Worren N.M., Losier G.F., Vallerand R.J. (1995). False consensus effects for the 1992 Canadian referendum. Can J Behav Sci 27(2):214–225

    Google Scholar 

  • Börgers T. (2004). Costly voting. Am Econ Rev 94:57–66

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brown C.E. (1982). A false consensus bias in 1980 presidential preferences. J Soc Psychol 118:137–138

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Campbell C.M. (1999). Large electorates and decisive minorities. J Pol Econ 107:1199–1217

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dawes R.M. (1990). The potential nonfalsity of the false consensus bias. In: Hogarth R.M. (eds) Insights in decision making: a tribute to Hillel J. Einhorn. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Foundation for information/ESOMAR: The freedom to publish opinion poll results. Mimeo (2003)

  • Ghosal, S., Lockwood, B.: Costly voting and inefficient participation. Mimeo (2004)

  • Krasa, S., Polborn, M.: Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting? Mimeo (2005)

  • Ledyard J.O. (1981). The paradox of voting and candidate competition: a general equilibrium analysis. In: Weiler T., Horwich G., Quirk J. (eds) Essays in contemporary fields of economics – in honor of Emanuel. Purdue University Press, West Lafayette Indiana

    Google Scholar 

  • Ledyard J.O. (1984). The pure theory of large two-candidate elections. Public Choice 44:7–41

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morwitz V.G., Pluzinsky C. (1996). Do polls reflect opinions or do opinions reflect polls? J Consum Res 23:53–67

    Google Scholar 

  • Mullen B., Atkins J.L, Champions D.S., Edwards C., Hardy D., Story J.E., Vanderklok M. (1985). The false consensus effect: a meta-analysis of 155 hypothesis tests. J Exp Soc Psychol 21:262–283

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Myatt, D.P.: A new theory of strategic voting. Mimeo (2002)

  • Palfrey T.R., Rosenthal H. (1983). A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice 41:7–53

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Palfrey T.R., Rosenthal H. (1985). Voter participation and strategic uncertainty. Am Pol Sci Rev 79:62–78

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ross L., Greene D., House P. (1977). The false consensus effect: an egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes. J Pers Soc Psychol 13:279–301

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, C.R., Yildirim, H.: Public information and electoral bias. Mimeo (2005)

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, CALTECH, Pasadena, CA, 91125, USA

    Jacob K. Goeree

  2. Economics Department, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08544, USA

    Jens Großer

Authors
  1. Jacob K. Goeree
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Jens Großer
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jacob K. Goeree.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Goeree, J.K., Großer, J. Welfare Reducing Polls. Economic Theory 31, 51–68 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0082-x

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0082-x

Keywords

  • Strategic voting
  • Costly participation
  • Correlated preferences
  • Polls
  • Toss-up elections

JEL classification numbers

  • C70
  • D72