Summary.
Most of the literature on collusive behavior in auctions ignores two important issues that make collusion difficult to sustain at least in one-shot interactions: the detection of cheating and the verification of bids. Colluding bidders may deceive each other by using shill bidders. Also, if the identities of the bidders and their bids are not published then it would be difficult to verify the bid of a colluding bidder. This paper addresses these problems in one shot second price auctions where one bidder offers another bidder a side payment in exchange for not participating in the auction, while the number of other bidders is stochastic. In spite of the barriers to collusion mentioned above, a simple side payment mechanism which depends only on the auction price is introduced. It induces a successful collusion, eliminates the verification problem, provides no incentive for the use of shill bidders and guarantees that the proponent obtains ex-post non-negative payoff. The colluding bidders are ex-ante strictly better off compared with the competitive case, irrespective of their types.
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Received: 27 November 2002, Revised: 28 January 2005,
JEL Classification Numbers:
C72, D44, D82.
Yair Tauman: Correspondence to
We would like to thank an anonymous referee for very valuable comments and suggestions that significantly improved the paper. We thank Shmuel Zamir for a helpful discussion.
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Chen, CL., Tauman, Y. Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions. Economic Theory 28, 145–172 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0612-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0612-y