Summary.
We examine a problem with n players each facing the same binary choice. One choice is superior to the other. The simple assumption of competition - that an individual’s payoff falls with a rise in the number of players making the same choice, guarantees the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium (involving mixed strategies). As n increases, there are two opposing effects. First, events in the middle of the distribution - where a player finds itself having made the same choice as many others - become more likely, but the payoffs in these events fall. In opposition, events in the tails of the distribution - where a player finds itself having made the same choice as few others - become less likely, but the payoffs in these events remain high. We provide a sufficient condition (strong competition) under which an increase in the number of players leads to a reduction in the equilibrium probability that the superior choice is made.
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Received: 24 July 2003, Revised: 24 January 2005,
JEL Classification Numbers:
C72, D02, D49, L19.
Flavio M. Menezes: Correspondence to
This paper has benefitted from comments by an anonymous referee and seminar participants at the ANU, Boston University, Harvard University Law, Economics and Organization Seminar, University of Wisconsin and at the Econometrics Society Australasian Meetings, Auckland New Zealand. We also thank Lucian Bebchuk, Eddie Dekel, Oliver Hart, Luis Kaplov, Paulo Monteiro and John Quiggin for very useful comments. All errors are our own. Menezes acknowledges the financial support from ARC (grant no. 00000055) and the hospitality of EPGE/FGV and RSPAS/ANU.
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Menezes, F.M., Pitchford, R. Binary games with many players. Economic Theory 28, 125–143 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0611-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0611-z