Summary.
The basic analytical concepts, tools and results of the classical expected utility/subjective probability model of risk preferences and beliefs under subjective uncertainty can be extended to general “event-smooth” preferences over subjective acts that do not necessarily satisfy either of the key behavioral assumptions of the classical model, namely the Sure-Thing Principle or the Hypothesis of Probabilistic Sophistication. This is accomplished by a technique analogous to that used by Machina (1982) and others to generalize expected utility analysis under objective uncertainty, combined with an event-theoretic approach to the classical model and the use of a special class of subjective events, acts and mixtures that exhibit “almost-objective” like properties. The classical expected utility/subjective probability characterizations of outcome monotonicity, outcome derivatives, probabilistic sophistication, comparative and relative subjective likelihood, and comparative risk aversion are all globally “robustified” to general event-smooth preferences over subjective acts.
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Received: 4 May 2004, Revised: 4 October 2004,
JEL Classification Numbers:
D81.
This paper presents a considerably improved version of the concept of event-differentiability from Machina (1992). An alternative definition has been independently developed by Epstein (1999) in his analysis of the concept of uncertainty aversion. I am grateful to Kenneth Arrow, Mark Durst, Jürgen Eichberger, Daniel Ellsberg, Clive Granger, Simon Grant, Edi Karni, Peter Klibanoff, David Kreps, Duncan Luce, Robert Nau, Uzi Segal, Peter Wakker, Joel Watson and especially Larry Epstein, Ted Groves and Joel Sobel for helpful discussions and comments. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants No. 9209012 and 9870894.
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Machina, M.J. ‘Expected utility / subjective probability’ analysis without the sure-thing principle or probabilistic sophistication. Economic Theory 26, 1–62 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0573-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0573-6