Summary.
This paper considers the optimal contract when the current (hidden) action of an agent has a persistent effect on the future outcome. The optimal contract in a two-effort choice, two-period setting is characterized analytically and numerically. In particular, we show that persistence tends to make compensation less responsive to the first-period outcome. At the extreme, there are cases where the agent is perfectly insured against the first-period outcome: the agent obtains the same utility regardless of the first-period outcome. The model is extended to three periods. We also present a computational method to characterize an N-period model with two-period persistence.
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Received: 9 December 2003, Revised: 13 February 2004,
JEL Classification Numbers:
D82, J31, J65.
Correspondence to: Ayşegül Şahin
We are grateful to an anonymous referee, Jack Barron, Mark Bils, Hugo Hopenhayn, Per Krusell, Lance Lochner, Steve Williamson, and seminar participants at Concordia University, Purdue University, the applied theory meetings at University of Rochester, the Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2003, the Rochester Wegmans Conference 2002, and the Society for Economic Dynamics Meetings 2003 for their comments and suggestions. We also wish to thank Vera Brencic, Nancy Marmon, and Roxanne Stanoprud for excellent research assistance.
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Mukoyama, T., Şahin, A. Repeated moral hazard with persistence. Economic Theory 25, 831–854 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0488-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0488-2