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The Copeland rule and Condorcet’s principle

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Summary.

The purpose of this note is to shed some light on the relationship between the Copeland rule and the Condorcet principle in those cases where there does not exist a Condorcet winner. It will be shown that the Copeland rule ranks alternatives according to their distances to being a Condorcet winner.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Public Economics, University of Graz, Universitaetsstr. 15/E4, 8010, Graz, Austria

    Christian Klamler

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  1. Christian Klamler
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Correspondence to Christian Klamler.

Additional information

Received: 30 July 2003, Revised: 31 December 2003,

JEL Classification Numbers:

D70, D71.

Christian Klamler: I am very grateful to Daniel Eckert and Nick Baigent for their helpful comments.

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Klamler, C. The Copeland rule and Condorcet’s principle. Economic Theory 25, 745–749 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0467-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0467-7

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