Summary.
In a game of imperfect recall, a sequential equilibrium may not be a Nash equilibrium, and a perfect equilibrium may not be a sequential equilibrium. Sufficiency conditions weaker than perfect recall are given to ensure the standard relationships hold between perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium and Nash equilibrium.
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Received: 22 October 2003, Revised: 18 November 2003,
JEL Classification Numbers:
C72.
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Kline, J.J. Imperfect recall and the relationships between solution concepts in extensive games. Economic Theory 25, 703–710 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0454-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0454-4