Economic Theory

, Volume 25, Issue 3, pp 679–701 | Cite as

A bargaining approach to the Owen value and the Nash solution with coalition structure

Article

Summary.

The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for non-transferable utility (NTU) games is generalized so that a coalition structure among players is taken into account. The new mechanism yields the Owen value for transferable utility (TU) games with coalition structure as well as the consistent value (Maschler and Owen 1989, 1992) for NTU games with trivial coalition structure. Furthermore, we obtain a solution for pure bargaining problems with coalition structure which generalizes the Nash (1950) bargaining solution.

Keywords and Phrases:

Bargaining NTU game Coalition structure Owen value Nash solution. 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departamento de Estatistica e IOUniversidade de VigoVigoSpain

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