Summary.
A homogeneous Cournot duopoly with asymmetric information is analyzed. Every firm learns its own marginal cost parameter, but not the marginal cost parameter of the opponent. Every firm can commit to revealing its private information to the other firm, i.e. to share information. The influence of uncertainty aversion on the readiness of the duopolists to share cost information is analyzed. Uncertainty aversion is modeled according to the Choquet utility theory. It is shown that low uncertainty aversion leads the firms to share information, while high uncertainty aversion leads the firms not to share. A simple economic explanation for this result is given.
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Received: 5 January 2001, Revised: 7 May 2003,
JEL Classification Numbers:
D43, D81, D82.
I wish to thank Jürgen Eichberger, Volker Krätschmer, Willy Spanjers, seminar participants at Universität des Saarlandes, seminar participants at University College London, participants in the conference of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Mainz 1999 and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Central Bank.
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Tapking, J. Cost information sharing with uncertainty averse firms. Economic Theory 23, 879–907 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0399-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0399-7