Summary.
The requirement that a voting procedure be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election can be formalized in different ways. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have recently shown that two formalizations of this candidate stability property are incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of their impossibility theorems.
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Received: August 15, 2001; revised version: March 11, 2002
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ID="*" Parts of this article were previously circulated in somewhat different form in a working paper with the same title by the second author. We are grateful to Michel Le Breton and an anonymous referee for their comments.
Correspondence to:J.A. Weymark
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Ehlers, L., Weymark, J. Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice. Econ Theory 22, 233–243 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0279-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0279-6