Journal of Evolutionary Economics

, Volume 18, Issue 5, pp 615–638 | Cite as

Cournot competition and endogenous firm size

  • Francesco Saraceno
  • Jason Barr
Regular Article


The paper studies the dynamics of firm size in a repeated Cournot game with unknown demand function. We model the firm as a type of artificial neural network. Each period it must learn to map environmental signals to both a demand parameter and its rival’s output choice. However, this learning game is in the background, as we focus on the endogenous adjustment of network size. We investigate the long-run evolution of firm/network size as a function of profits, rival’s size, and the type of adjustment rules used.


Firm size Adjustment dynamics Artificial neural networks Cournot games 

JEL Classification

C63 D21 D83 L13 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Observatoire Français des Conjonctures ÉconomiquesParisFrance
  2. 2.Rutgers UniversityNewarkUSA

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