Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

, Volume 59, Issue 3, pp 359–373 | Cite as

Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?

  • Jason ShachatEmail author
  • J. Todd Swarthout


We conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting deviations from Nash equilibrium. However, there is heterogeneity in subject behavior and performance. We present a one variable model of dynamic random belief formation which rationalizes observed heterogeneity and other features of the data.


Nash Equilibrium Nash Variable Model Mixed Strategy Belief Formation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.National University of SingaporeSingapore
  2. 2.University of ArizonaSingapore

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