Abstract.
In this paper, we study the position value for games in which partial cooperation exist, that is based on a union stable coalition system. The concept of basis is introduced for these systems, allowing for a definition of the position value. Moreover, an axiomatic characterization of the position value is provided for a specific class of union stable systems. Conditions under which convexity is inherited from the underlying game to the conference game, and the position value is a core vector of the restricted game are provided.
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Manuscript received: October 1998
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Algaba, E., Bilbao, J., Borm, P. et al. The position value for union stable systems. Mathematical Methods of OR 52, 221–236 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860000060
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860000060