Abstract
In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game.
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Estévez-Fernández, A., Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G., Mosquera, M.A. et al. A bankruptcy approach to the core cover. Math Meth Oper Res 76, 343–359 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-012-0409-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-012-0409-2