Abstract
In this paper, we provide two characterizations in the context of NTU games: of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core. The first characterization is based on reduced games and contraction and expansion independence. The second one is based on reduced games and sub-reduced games.
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Hwang, YA. Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games. Math Meth Oper Res 64, 557–568 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-006-0100-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-006-0100-6