Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

, Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 435–442

The Shapley Valuation Function for Strategic Games in which Players Cooperate

  • Luisa Carpente
  • Balbina Casas-Méndez
  • Ignacio García-Jurado
  • Anne van den Nouweland
Original Article

DOI: 10.1007/s00186-005-0028-2

Cite this article as:
Carpente, L., Casas-Méndez, B., García-Jurado, I. et al. Math Meth Oper Res (2006) 63: 435. doi:10.1007/s00186-005-0028-2

Abstract

In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined using the lower-value based method to associate coalitional games with strategic games that was introduced in Carpente et al. (2005). We discuss axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley valuation function.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luisa Carpente
    • 1
  • Balbina Casas-Méndez
    • 2
  • Ignacio García-Jurado
    • 2
  • Anne van den Nouweland
    • 3
  1. 1.Departamento de Matemáticas, Facultade de InformáticaUniversidade da CoruñaCoruñaSpain
  2. 2.Departamento de Estatística e IO, Facultade de MatemáticasUniversidade de Santiago de CompostelaSantiago de CompostelaSpain
  3. 3.Department of Economics, 435 PLCUniversity of OregonEugeneUSA

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