Abstract.
Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows that the equivalence is not preserved since these solutions can all be different for cooperative games with random payoffs. Properties are studied and a characterization on a subclass of games is provided.
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2000 Mathematics Subject Classification Number: 91A12.
The authors thank two anonymous referees and an associate editor for their helpful comments.
This author acknowledges financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) through project 613-304-059.
Received: October 2000
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Timmer, J., Borm, P. & Tijs, S. On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs. Int J Game Theory 32, 595–613 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400181
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400181