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Decentralized versus collective bargaining – An experimental study

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Abstract.

Two parties X, and Y, can either bargain separately with a third party Z or merge to become XY and bargain collectively with Z. Depending on the payoff implications of the two possible contracts and on the asymmetry inherent in the conflict payoffs of X and Y collective bargaining will increase, decrease or leave constant what X and Y achieve together. In the experiment, first X and Y vote for or against collective bargaining and then negotiate accordingly. Participants react adequately to strategic aspects, but not as predicted by the (Nash-)bargaining solution.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Statistik u. Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Universität Karlsruhe, 76128 Karlsruhe, Germany, , , , , , DE

    S. Berninghaus

  2. Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie III, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, 10178 Berlin, Germany, , , , , , DE

    W. Güth & R. Lechler

  3. Fakultät f. Volkswirtschaftslehre u. Statistik, Universität Konstanz, 78464 Konstanz, Germany, , , , , , DE

    H.-J. Ramser

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  1. S. Berninghaus
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  2. W. Güth
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  3. R. Lechler
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  4. H.-J. Ramser
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Received: April 2000/Final version: December 2001

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Berninghaus, S., Güth, W., Lechler, R. et al. Decentralized versus collective bargaining – An experimental study. Game Theory 30, 437–448 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200089

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200089

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