Abstract.
Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a joint strategy where each player has an expected payoff of at least r is NP-complete as a function of the number of nodes in the extensive-form representation of the game.
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Received January 2001/Final version May 1, 2001
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Chu, F., Halpern, J. On the NP-completeness of finding an optimal strategy in games with common payoffs. Game Theory 30, 99–106 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100066
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100066