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Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games

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Abstract.

This paper deals with a specific aspect of the problem of coalition formation in a situation described by a TU-game. First, we define a very simple normal form game which models the process of coalition formation. To define the payoff functions of the players we use an allocation rule for TU-games. The main objective of this paper is ascertain what conditions of the allocation rule lead to the grand coalition being a strong equilibrium of the normal form game, when the original TU-game is convex.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Statistics and OR, Faculty of Sciences, University of Alicante, San Vicente del Raspeig, 03071 Alicante, Spain, , , , , , ES

    Ana Meca-Martínez & J. Sánchez-Soriano

  2. Department of Statistics and OR, University of Santiago de Compostela, 15706, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, , , , , , ES

    I. García-Jurando

  3. Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, , , , , , NL

    Stef Tijs

Authors
  1. Ana Meca-Martínez
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  2. J. Sánchez-Soriano
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  3. I. García-Jurando
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  4. Stef Tijs
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Additional information

Received January 1996/Revised version December 1996/Final version May 1997

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Meca-Martínez, A., Sánchez-Soriano, J., García-Jurando, I. et al. Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games. Game Theory 27, 211–217 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050067

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050067

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