Abstract
A Generalized Additive Game (GAG) (Cesari et al. in Int J Game Theory 46(4):919–939, 2017) is a Transferable Utility (TU) game (N, v), where each player in N is provided with an individual value, and the worth v(S) of a coalition \(S \subseteq N\) is obtained as the sum of the individual values of players in another subset \(\mathcal {M}(S)\subseteq N\). Based on conditions on the map \(\mathcal {M}\) (which associates to each coalition S a set of beneficial players \(\mathcal {M}(S)\) not necessarily included in S), in this paper we characterize classes of GAGs that satisfy properties like monotonicity, superadditivity, (total) balancedness, PMAS-admissibility and supermodularity, for all nonnegative vectors of individual values. We also illustrate the application of such conditions on \(\mathcal {M}\) over particular GAGs studied in the literature (e.g., glove games (Shapley and Shubik in Int Econ Rev 10:337–362, 1969), generalized airport games (Norde et al. in Eur J Oper Res 136(3):635–654, 2002), fixed tree games (Bjørndal et al. in Math Methods Oper Res 59(2):249–270, 2004), link-connection games (Moretti in Multi-agent systems and agreement technologies, vol 10767. Springer, Cham, 2008; Nagamochi et al. in Math Oper Res 22(1):146–164, 1997), simple minimum cost spanning tree games (Norde et al. in Eur J Oper Res 154(1):84–97, 2004; Tijs et al. in Eur J Oper Res 175(1):121–134, 2006) and graph coloring games (Deng et al. in Math Program 87(3):441–452, 2000; Hamers et al. in Math Program 145(1–2):509–529, 2014)).
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S. Moretti gratefully acknowledges the support of the ANR project THEMIS (ANR-20-CE23-0018).
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Moretti, S., Norde, H. Some new results on generalized additive games. Int J Game Theory 51, 87–118 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00786-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00786-w