Abstract
We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for the kth price auction by using inverse of distribution functions. As applications, we identify the unique symmetric equilibrium where the valuations have polynomial distribution, fat tail distribution and exponential distributions.
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Appendix
Appendix
Lemma 6.1
Consider a real valued bounded function \(\hat{Q}:{\mathbb {R}}\mapsto [0,1]\). For positive integer r and positive real number m, let \(A_r(u,z){:=} {\hat{Q}}(z)(u-z)^r z^m\)and \(H_r(u){:=}\int _0^u A_r(u,z) dz\). Then the \((r+1)^{th}\)derivative of \(H_r(u)\)is
Proof
By the Leibniz rule (Rudin et al. 1964) of differentiating an integral, if \(H(u){:=} \int _{l_0(u)}^{l_1(u)} A(u,z) dz\), under assumption of integrability of \(\partial _u A(u,z)\), it holds:
It is easy to check the integrability of \(\partial _u{\hat{Q}}(z)(u-z)^r z^m\), thus taking \(l_0(u)=0, l_1(u) = u\) in the previous equation:
For \(r=0\), \(A_0(u,u) = \hat{Q}(u)u^m\) and \(\partial _u A_0(u,z)=0\). For \(r\geqslant 1\), \(A_r(u,u) = 0\) and \(\partial _u A_r(u,z) = \hat{Q}(z)r(u-z)^{r-1}z^m = rA_{r-1}(u,z)\). Therefore (19) implies
Thus for \(t\leqslant r\):
so \(H_r^{(r)}(u) = r!H_0(u)\) and therefore \(H_r^{(r+1)}(u) = r!H_0'(u) = r!\hat{Q}(u)u^m.\)\(\square \)
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Mihelich, M., Shu, Y. Analytical solution of kth price auction. Int J Game Theory 49, 875–884 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00729-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00729-x
Keywords
- Vickrey auctions
- kth Price auctions
- Inverse distribution functions