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Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives

  • Alexander Shapoval
  • Shlomo Weber
  • Alexei ZakharovEmail author
Original Paper
  • 30 Downloads

Abstract

In this paper we examine the effects of valence in a continuous spatial voting model with two incumbent candidates and a potential entrant. All candidates are rank-motivated. We first consider the case where the low valence incumbent (LVC) and the entrant have zero valence, whereas the valence of the high valence incumbent (HVC) is positive. We show that a sufficiently large valence of HVC guarantees a unique equilibrium, where the two incumbents prevent the entry of the third candidate. We also show that an increase in valence allows HVC to adopt a more centrist policy position, while LVC selects a more extreme position. We also examine the existence of equilibrium for the cases where the LVC has higher or lower valence than the entrant.

Keywords

Valence Candidates Electoral game Rank objectives Electoral equilibrium Distribution of ideal points 

Mathematics Subject Classification

C72 D72 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Shapoval
    • 1
  • Shlomo Weber
    • 2
    • 3
  • Alexei Zakharov
    • 1
    Email author
  1. 1.National Research University Higher School of EconomicsMoscowRussia
  2. 2.New Economic SchoolMoscowRussia
  3. 3.Southern Methodist UniversityDallasUSA

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