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Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable

  • Martin Van der LindenEmail author
Original Paper
  • 59 Downloads

Abstract

This paper shows that the deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) cannot be improved upon in terms of manipulability without compromising stability. A conflict between manipulability and fairness is also identified. Stable mechanisms that minimize the set of individuals who match with their least preferred achievable mate are shown to be maximally manipulable among the stable mechanisms. These mechanisms are also more manipulable than DA. A similar conflict between fairness and manipulability is identified in the case of the median stable mechanisms.

Keywords

Matching Deferred acceptance Manipulability Stability Fairness 

JEL

C78 D47 D82 

Supplementary material

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Utah State UniversityLoganUSA

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