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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 45, Issue 1–2, pp 461–496 | Cite as

The complexity of interacting automata

  • Olivier Gossner
  • Penélope Hernández
  • Ron PeretzEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

This paper studies the interaction of automata of size m. We characterise statistical properties satisfied by random plays generated by a correlated pair of automata with m states each. We show that in some respect the pair of automata can be identified with a more complex automaton of size comparable to \(m\log m\). We investigate implications of these results on the correlated min–max value of repeated games played by automata.

Keywords

Complexity Automata De Bruijn sequences Bounded memory 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to three anonymous referees and an editor who contributed valuable suggestions that significantly improved the quality of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Olivier Gossner
    • 1
    • 2
  • Penélope Hernández
    • 3
  • Ron Peretz
    • 4
    Email author
  1. 1.École Polytechnique, CNRSParisFrance
  2. 2.London School of EconomicsLondonUK
  3. 3.University of ValenciaValenciaSpain
  4. 4.Bar Ilan University Ramat GanIsrael

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