International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 45, Issue 4, pp 933–970 | Cite as

First-mover advantage in best-of series: an experimental comparison of role-assignment rules

Original Paper
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Abstract

Kingston (J Comb Theory (A) 20:357–363, 1976) and Anderson (J Comb Theory (A) 23:363, 1977) show that the probability that a given contestant wins a best-of-\(2k+1\) series of asymmetric, zero-sum, binary-outcome games is, for a large class of assignment rules, independent of which contestant is assigned the advantageous role in each component game. We design a laboratory experiment to test this hypothesis for four simple role-assignment rules. Despite significant differences in the frequency of equilibrium play across the four assignment rules, our results show that the four rules are observationally equivalent at the series level: the fraction of series won by a given contestant and all other series outcomes do not differ across rules.

Keywords

Experimental economics Two-sided competitions Best-of series Asymmetric game Psychological pressure 

JEL Classification

C90 D02 L83 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsWilfrid Laurier UniversityWaterlooCanada
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsBen-Gurion UniversityBeershebaIsrael

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