International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 45, Issue 4, pp 817–838

Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0487-5

Cite this article as:
Karos, D. Int J Game Theory (2016) 45: 817. doi:10.1007/s00182-015-0487-5
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Abstract

I propose a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to find solutions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities. I show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegotiated. In the ordinal game derived from these payoff configurations, a core stable partition can be found, i.e. a partition in which no group of players has an incentive to jointly change their coalitions.

Keywords

Games with non-transferable utility in partition function form Bargaining with claims Ordinal games Core stable partitions 

JEL Classification

C71 C78 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK

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