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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 43, Issue 3, pp 599–618 | Cite as

False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives

  • Liad WagmanEmail author
  • Vincent Conitzer
Article

Abstract

In open, anonymous settings such as the Internet, agents can participate in a mechanism multiple times under different identities. A mechanism is false-name-proof if no agent ever benefits from participating more than once. Unfortunately, the design of false-name-proof mechanisms has been hindered by a variety of negative results. In this paper, we show how some of these negative results can be circumvented by making the realistic assumption that obtaining additional identities comes at a (potentially small) cost. We consider arbitrary such costs and apply our results within the context of a voting model with two alternatives.

Keywords

Mechanism design False-name-proofness Voting   Revelation principle Anonymity 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We thank conference participants and participants at the Duke University Microeconomic Theory workshops; the Rice University Microeconomic Theory workshops; and Kyushu University in Japan. We especially thank Makoto Yokoo’s research group, Hervé Moulin, Lirong Xia, and anonymous referees for helpful feedback and discussions. Wagman has benefited from support from the Program for Advanced Research in the Social Sciences and from the Yahoo! Faculty Research and Engagement Program. Conitzer is grateful for support through NSF CCF-1101659, IIS-0812113, and IIS-0953756, ARO W911NF-12-1-0550 and W911NF-11-1-0332, and an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Stuart School of BusinessIllinois Institute of TechnologyChicagoUSA
  2. 2.Departments of Computer Science and Economics, Levine Science Research CenterDuke UniversityDurhamUSA

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